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ABSTRACT
In this Article, written on the heels of Race + IP 2017, a
conference we co-organized with Amit Basole1 and Jessica Silbey,2 we
propose and articulate a theoretical framework for an interdisciplinary
movement that we call Critical Race Intellectual Property (Critical Race
IP).3 Specifically, we argue that given trends toward maximalist
intellectual property policy, it is now more important than ever to study
the racial investments and implications of the laws of copyright,
trademark, patent, right of publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition
in a manner that draws upon Critical Race Theory (CRT). Situating our
argument in a historical context, we articulate the provisional
boundaries and core ideological commitments that define Critical Race
IP, particularly in contrast with Critical Intellectual Property. After
exploring the landscape of this developing area of study through its
central themes, we draw upon scholarship on public feelings to
demonstrate the importance of community building and intimacymaking practices in the growth of Critical Race IP. Public feelings are
an implicit and often under-theorized aspect of intellectual property law
that comes to the forefront in engagements with race and colonialism.
We conclude with a discussion of Critical Race IP as decolonizing
praxis that can aid in anti-racist and anti-colonial struggles.
Race enters writing and the making of art, as a structure of feeling, as
something that structures feelings, that lays down tracks of affection
and repulsion, rage and hurt, desire and ache. These tracks don’t only
occur in the making of art; they also occur (sometimes viciously,
sometimes hazily) in the reception of creative work. Here we are
again: we’ve made this thing and we’ve sent it out into the world for
recognition—and because what we’ve made is in essence a field of
human experience created for other humans, the field and its maker
and its readers are thus subject all over again to race and its
1

Associate Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University.
Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law, Innovation, and Creativity (CLIC) at
Northeastern University School of Law.
3
-Anjali Vats, Deidré Keller, Amit Basole & Jessica Silbey, RACE + IP,
http://raceipconference.org/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017); see also infra Introduction.
2
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infiltrations. In that moment arise all sorts of possible hearings and
mis-hearings, all kinds of address and redress.4

[I]ntimacy . . . involves an aspiration for a narrative about something
shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a
particular way. Usually, this story is set within zones of familiarity
and comfort . . . animated by expressive and emancipating kinds of
love. Yet the inwardness of the intimate is met by a corresponding
publicness. People consent to trust their desire for ‘a life’ to
institutions of intimacy; and it is hoped that the relations formed
within those frames will turn out beautifully, lasting over the
duration, perhaps across generations.5

INTRODUCTION
In April 2017, Boston College hosted the inaugural Race + IP
conference.6 The collaborative work of an organizing committee
consisting of the authors of this Article, Amit Basole, and Jessica
Silbey,7 Race + IP 2017 brought together scholars from around the
world and across disciplines for what the organizers intended to be
generative discussions of issues and questions at the intersections of
race, colonialism, and intellectual property.8 This is the first of what we
hope will be many pieces prompted and informed by those discussions.
In this piece, we explore and articulate the interdisciplinary movement
of Critical Race Intellectual Property (Critical Race IP). 9
Race + IP 2017 was the outcome of many years of thought,
research, and discussion on the part of the authors, often in
collaboration with other scholars—such as Laura Foster,10 Rayvon
Fouché11 and Lateef Mtima12—who work at the intersections of race
4

Claudia Rankine & Beth Loffreda, On Whiteness and the Racial Imaginary, LITERARY HUB
(April 9, 2015), https://lithub.com/on-whiteness-and-the-racial-imaginary.
5
Lauren Berlant, Intimacy: A Special Issue, 24 CRITICAL INQUIRY 281 (1998).
6
Vats et al., supra note 3.
7
Id.
8
Anjali Vats, Deidré Keller, Amit Basole & Jessica Silbey, Schedule, RACE + IP,
http://raceipconference.org/conference-schedule/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017).
9
Here, we take a page from Cultural Studies, which has been termed an “interdisciplinary
movement” and a “network.” See Richard Johnson, What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?, 16 SOC.
TEXT 38 (1986). Unlike many Cultural Studies scholars, we argue for “academic codification” in
this Article. See Tony Bennett, Cultural Studies: A Reluctant Discipline, 12 CULTURAL STUD.
528, 533 (citing Johnson and noting, “The concerns that inform [Johnson] . . . and there are many
[similar concerns expressed] in the literature—are clear enough. Cultural studies, having accused
other humanities disciplines of ‘fixing’ knowledge into particular intellectual and institutional
frameworks, must fight shy of both institutionalization and codification if it is not simply to
become just another discipline of the kind it had earlier pitched itself against.”).
10
Laura Foster, IND. U. BLOOMINGTON, https://genderstudies.indiana.edu/about/faculty/fosterlaura.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
11
Rayvon
Fouché,
PURDUE
U.,
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and intellectual property. We introduce Race + IP 2017 here to offer
context for the conversations that are occurring in Critical Race IP. As
in Critical Race Theory (CRT), histories of the interdisciplinary study of
race, particularly those that center on scholars of color, are an important
part of the intellectual project. Our work, therefore, both tells a story of
a developing field of study and highlights the work of scholars in the
area.13 Our aim is to examine the intersections and divergences among
CRT, Critical Intellectual Property, and Critical Race IP. We begin, as
we must, given that CRT is foundational to our enterprise, with a brief
foray into that area.
Devon Carbado recently wrote an article entitled “Critical What
What?” in which he traced one version of the genesis story, histories,
boundaries, and future of CRT.14 He recounts:
When my colleagues and I proposed the establishment of a Critical
Race Studies specialization at UCLA School of Law more than a
decade ago, the only push back we got was over the name. Why
Critical Race Studies? Why not Civil Rights? Race and the Law?
Anti-Discrimination Studies?. . . . [T]he episode suggested that there
was something in and about the name. By any other name, our
faculty meeting on the matter would have been considerably shorter.
. . . This should not lead one to conclude that the ‘Critical what
what?’ question is only about the name. The query is about the
whatness (or, less charitably, the ‘there there’) of CRT as well. What
is the genesis of CRT? What are the core ideas? What are its goals
and aspirations? What intellectual work does the theory perform
outside of legal discourse? What are the limitations of the theory?
What is its future trajectory?15

As many scholars before us have argued, CRT is a rich, diverse,
and nuanced interdisciplinary movement, bound together by shared
tenets and goals related to the racial non-neutrality of law.16 Broadly
speaking, CRT evolved as a response to Critical Legal Studies (CLS),17
https://cla.purdue.edu/academic/sis/directory/index.aspx?p=Rayvon_Fouch%C3%A9 (last visited
Oct. 9, 2017).
12
Lateef Mtima, HOW. U., http://law.howard.edu/faculty-staff/lateef-mtima (last visited Oct. 9,
2017).
13
As part of the Conference, we have been building a Critical Race IP reading list to offer an indepth look at those works which define and inform the subfield. A copy of that list will be
available at: Critical Race IP Reading List, www.raceipconference.org/readinglist (forthcoming
2018).
14
Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593 (2011).
15
Id. at 1595.
16
See, e.g., Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus
Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARVARD EDUC. REV. 659 (2009).
17
See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas, Introduction to
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxii (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future
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and it functions as a move to center questions of race and racialization,
in intersectional ways, while CLS had focused primarily on class and
power.18 At the same time, CRT aims to make progressive interventions
in the existing law and scholarship of antidiscrimination, particularly
while centering the voices of people of color.19
Over the last twenty-five years, CRT has grown from the project of
a small group of scholars in legal academia to a transdisciplinary project
for conceptualizing the many ways that state and cultural apparatuses
protect the privileges of whiteness at the expense of people of color.20
While always retaining its core identity as a critique of law in theory
and practice, its intersectional, race-centered analysis informs the work
of scholars across disciplines and defines the vocabulary of popular
cultural social justice discussions.21 As Carbado stresses, it is imperative
that “we conceptualize CRT as a verb,”22 as in the practice of critical
race theorizing, reading it as a dynamic area of study with evolving
meanings, boundaries, and scope. Just as CRT has evolved temporally,
as we have moved from the post-Civil Rights era into the purported
post-racial era,23 it has also evolved in its content. As Francisco Valdes,
Jerome McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris write about CRT at the
turn of the century: “For a small band of scholars whose ideas are set
out in multisyllabic words and who travel with armies of footnotes,
Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 356
(2006).
18
See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., Arild Buanes & Svein Jentoft, Building bridges: Institutional perspectives on
interdisciplinarity, 41 FUTURES 446 (2009); Imani Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory
and Some Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REV. 915 (2005). On transdisciplinarity generally,
see Marilyn Stember, Advancing the social sciences through the interdisciplinary enterprise, 28
SOC. SCI. J. 1 (1991).
21
See, e.g., Christine Emba, Intersectionality, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/21/intersectionality-aprimer/?utm_term=.36cdd414474f (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“Over the past several years
‘intersectionality’ has become a feminist buzzword, deployed in discussions of pop culture,
political action and academic debate. Considering its recent prominence, it’s surprising to realize
that the term has been around only since 1989—it was coined by legal scholar and critical theorist
Kimberlé Crenshaw, in a paper illustrating how black women were often marginalized by both
feminist and anti-racist movements because their concerns did not fit comfortably within either
group.”); see also Clare Foran, Hillary Clinton’s Intersectional Politics, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/hillary-clintonintersectionality/472872 (“Clinton’s invocation of intersectionality may also broaden popular
understanding of the concept. In popular culture, it has been variously deployed. Intersectionality
has been denounced by conservatives as a form of identity politics. Progressives, meanwhile,
have used the term both to conceptualize identity and as a framework to broadly explain how
different structural barriers operate simultaneously. Clinton is using the concept to denote an
integrated approach to dealing with deeply-intertwined environmental, economic, and social
problems.”).
22
Carbado, supra note 14, at 1602.
23
See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009).
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CRT has had, as noted at the outset, an extraordinary impact on popular
as well as on legal discourse.”24
We invoke Carbado’s work specifically to introduce another
“Critical What What”—namely Critical Race IP.25 Critical Race IP, as
we define it, refers to the interdisciplinary movement of scholars
connected by their focus on the racial and colonial non-neutrality of the
laws of copyright, patent, trademark, right of publicity, trade secret, and
unfair competition using principles informed by CRT.26 The
groundbreaking work of legal scholars such as Keith Aoki,27 Rosemary
Coombe,28 Margaret Chon,29 Kevin J. Greene,30 Madhavi Sunder,31
Anupam Chander,32 Olufunmilayo Arewa,33 Ruth Okediji,34 and
others35 tackles questions regarding the racial and neo-colonial
inequality that intellectual property law produces in contexts such as
trade and development, music, film, and traditional knowledge (TK).
We articulate a framework that reads these works together, as a body of
scholarship with shared tenets about the racialized hierarchies inherent
in IP law and its attendant ordering of knowledge. We do not mean to
suggest that these scholars employ the same methods or make the same
critiques, only that they are tied together by a set of assumptions about
intellectual property law, including that it operates to protect the power
24

Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris, Introduction to CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 1 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
25
We shy away from the perhaps obvious acronym “CrIP” because of the use of the term “crip”
in the context of disability studies to reclaim the power of the differently-abled body. See, e.g.,
ROBERT MCRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY (2006).
26
Anjali Vats, Deidré Keller, Amit Basole & Jessica Silbey, CFP, RACE + IP,
http://raceipconference.org/call-for-papers/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017) (“Broadly considered,
critical race IP brings together two strands of scholarship: critical race theory and IP. Scholarship
in critical race IP, which engages a variety of topics and texts, focuses on questions which
thematically examine the relationship between race and racial formation and the study of
copyrights, trademarks, patents, rights of publicity and trade secrets. Issues such as the
trademarking of #BlackLivesMatter, the creation of race-based patents, the deployment of
rhetorics of piracy demonstrate that race and IP intersect in important and complex ways.”).
27
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
28
See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998).
29
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821 (2006).
30
See, e.g., K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over
African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008).
31
See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006).
32
See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1331 (2004).
33
See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277 (2006).
34
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Africa and the Global Intellectual Property System: Beyond the
Agency Model, 12 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 207 (2004).
35
This list is not exhaustive, only exemplary. We have selected these works as representative of
the type of race and intellectual property scholarship that confronts the hegemony of the law and
economics framework and pushes for critiques of its assumptions and implications.
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of whiteness and the Global North. We proceed by asking a series of
questions about Critical Race IP, particularly related to its necessity,
purpose, investments, scope, relationships to anti-racist and anticolonial activism, and possible future directions.
What is Critical Race IP? Why is it necessary? Whose work does it
build upon and whose work does it describe? How and where is it
emerging? What are its central themes? Where are its boundaries? How
might it inform the work of anti-racist and anti-colonialist activists? In
asking these questions, we do not profess to assign scholars labels or
dictate who may identify as a “Race IP Crit.”36 Rather, our hope is to
engage in a conversation about the area, its relationship to CRT and
Critical IP, as well as its potential futures. We believe it is imperative to
continue to consider the relationship between post-Fordism, the
economic system marked by “flexible accumulation”37 rather than
standardized industrial mass production as a panacea for economic
growth, and a means of reconstructing racial and neo-colonial
hierarchies in the evolving contexts of intellectual property law. 38 We
also believe, as Sunder argues in her scathing critique of the law and
economics approach to intellectual property law, “law must facilitate
the ability of all citizens, rich or poor, brown or white, man or woman,
straight or gay, to participate in making knowledge of our world and to
benefit materially from their cultural production.”39
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, “Why Critical Race
IP?”, we identify some historical contexts and motivating impulses
behind Critical Race IP. We trace the sociopolitical and economic
36

We use the term Race IP Crit to both invoke the notion of the Race Crit, i.e. a scholar who
identifies as part of the CRT community, and highlight our addition of an intellectual property
element to that critical race posture. For an example of the invocation of the term Race Crit, see
Valdes et al., supra note 24 at 33.
37
See Martha Macdonald, Post-Fordism and the Flexibility Debate, 36 STUD. POL. ECON. 177,
177 (1991) (“Essentially, the debate surrounding post-fordism/flexibility has to do with the way
firms, industries and indeed national economies and world capitalism are restructuring in this era
of technological change, heightened international competition and rapidly changing markets.
Whereas the post-war period is characterized as one of mass production/consumption, planning,
control and stability, the current age, it is argued, requires flexibility and rapid response to change
by capital, and hence by labour.”); see also Bob Jessop, Post-Fordism and the State, in
COMPARATIVE WELFARE SYSTEMS: THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL IN A PERIOD OF CHANGE 165
(Bent Greve ed., 1996); E Schoenberger, From Fordism to Flexible Accumulation: Technology,
Competitive Strategies, and International Location, 6 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 245
(1988); see generally DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO
THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1989) (discussion of postmodernism and the transition to
post-Fordism); MICHEL AGLIETTA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION: THE US
EXPERIENCE 122–30 (2000).
38
See generally POST-FORDISM: A READER (Ash Amin ed., 200); Keith Aoki, Considering
Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sovereignty,
“Global” Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 457
(1998).
39
See MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE 23 (2012).
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conditions that gave rise to the scholarship focusing on race, social
justice, and intellectual property, as well as the reasons that articulating
a Critical Race IP is increasingly important. A central focus of this
section is exploring the relationship between CRT, Critical Race IP, and
Critical IP, a field of study that John Tehranian defines as concerned
with intellectual property law and power.40 In parsing the relationships
among those three areas, we turn to the debates which preceded and
resulted in the emergence of CRT after the development of CLS in the
1970s and 1980s for context. Part II, “The What What of Critical Race
IP,” explores some important themes in Critical Race IP, examining
how scholars across disciplines read intellectual property’s lack of race
neutrality and the tenets that inform their analyses. In particular, we
explore how the “race” in Critical Race IP is both consonant with and
diverges from the “race” in CRT. We also define “intellectual property,”
the body of laws that Critical Race IP engages. Conversations at Race +
IP 2017 come to the fore in this section as we locate some provisional
boundaries of Critical Race IP as well as the its ideological
commitments, which include reading across categories such as race,
ethnicity, national identity, and neo-coloniality in intersectional ways in
order to reveal intellectual property law’s racial investments in
whiteness and continuing implications for racial (in)equality.
In Part III, “All We Have is Each Other: Community Building and
Public Feelings in Critical Race IP,” we explore the role of community
building in the development of the study of race and intellectual
property. We draw upon CRT’s formative workshops and commitment
to engagement with public feelings to consider the centrality of
relationships in building new professional and public sensibilities
around Critical Race IP. In short, we posit that a Critical Race IP lens
can help create greater anti-racist and social justice consciousness, thus
informing the work of scholars, practitioners, and activists.
Finally, Part IV, “Critical Race IP as Decolonizing Praxis,”
investigates why and how the study of Critical Race IP can offer
insights not only into addressing the racial bias of intellectual property
law which informs systems of ownership, circulation, and distribution
of knowledge, but also highlights new avenues for anti-racist and anticolonial struggle.41 Crystallizing a set of tenets which define and
40

See John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1233, 1243–44 (2012) (“I refer to this body of work as ‘critical IP theory,’
which I loosely define as the deconstruction of trademark, copyright, and patent laws and norms
in light of existing power relationships to better understand the role of intellectual property in
both maintaining and perpetuating social hierarchy and subordination.”).
41
See, e.g., Bonita Lawrence & Enakshi Dua, Decolonizing Anti-Racism, 32 SOC. JUS. 120
(2005); see also Nandita Sharma & Cynthia Wright, Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging
Colonial States, 35 SOC. JUS. 120 (2009). We are aware of the tensions between anti-racist and
anti-colonial discourse. We do not intend to elide those tensions but do recognize that a full
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animate Critical Race IP helps us to understand how some scholars
approach the study of the complex connections between race and
knowledge production, and how we might undo those racially
inequitable connections. We close with a discussion of decolonizing
Critical Race IP, asserting that theories and practices of decolonization
are productive for thinking about new approaches to addressing issues
of race and social justice in intellectual property.
I. WHY CRITICAL RACE IP
Neither infringement nor Copyright Wars are new phenomena.
Their repeated themes stretch back hundreds of years. 42 William Patry
argues that the most recent Copyright Wars occurred in 1998, “when
copyright owners obtained from Congress unprecedented rights to
control access to and use of their works.”43 With the radical changes
brought by Betamax, VHS, the Internet, and Napster between the 1970s
and 1990s, big content owners found themselves in deeply unfamiliar
and rapidly shifting territory that impacted their core business models. 44
These technological developments which made copying, transforming,
and remixing copyrighted and trademarked works easy for the average
consumer fundamentally threatened the profits of entertainment
industries that had previously held near monopolies on production and
distribution in their respective markets.45 Similarly, technological
changes ushered in by the era of biotechnology demanded legal and
cultural responses.46 Negotiating the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in 1994 (TRIPS Agreement)

engagement with those tensions is beyond the scope of this piece. Instead, we are intentionally
seeking to articulate Critical Race IP as a space in which racialized and colonized persons can
capitalize upon opportunities for solidarity. See discussion infra Part II.A, Part IV. On the
potential for such solidarity in other contexts, see, e.g., Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández,
Decolonization and the pedagogies of solidarity, 1 DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. &
SOC’Y 41 (2012).
42
See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); see also ADRIAN
JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010);
PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC BATTLE
(2014).
43
See PATRY, supra note 42, at xix.
44
See, e.g., id. at 8–9 (“Due to their push mentality, the copyright industries view the entirety of
copyright as unidirectional: the public is a passive participant, whose role is simply to pay
copyright owners, or stop using copyrighted works. As we shall now see, the record industry’s
fanatical attachment to push marketing led them to miss and early and perhaps their best chance
to take advantage of Internet pull marketing and to eliminate in the process a great deal of
unauthorized file-sharing.”).
45
See generally Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological
Change, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 307 (1989); Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The
Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009).
46
See generally Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human
Genetics, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383 (2010).
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created an unprecedented global intellectual property regime,47
compliance with which was encouraged, through more and less coercive
means.48 Mark Getty of Getty Images,49 proclaimed that intellectual
property is “the oil of the twenty-first century.”50 Though the accuracy
of this statement is debatable,51 the argument for protecting that “oil”
gathered (maximalist) steam.52 The global public response to these
expansions of intellectual property rights was considerable. Pressure for
free and open culture,53 critiques of biopiracy,54 adbusting and culture
jamming campaigns,55 and large scale protests56 were some of the ways
people pushed back against the rise of intellectual property maximalism.
The economic conditions ushered in by the rise of the post-Fordist
economy not only transformed intellectual property into an increasingly
“precious commodit[y],”57—one which legal scholars almost
exclusively theorized through the lens of law and economics58—they
47

See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 104
(2004) (citation omitted) (“TRIPS has been hailed as ‘the most far reaching and comprehensive
legal regime ever concluded at the multinational level in the area of intellectual property
rights.’”); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and
Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998); Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and
Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 507 (1996).
48
Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: Revisiting
Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 191–92 (citations omitted)
(“Built on the cornerstone of the ‘Great Conventions’ the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)
profoundly altered the nature, scope, and economic consequences of international intellectual
property regulation.”).
49
About Us, GETTY IMAGES, http://press.gettyimages.com/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
(describing Getty Images as “among the world’s leading creators and distributors of awardwinning still imagery, video, music and multimedia products,”).
50
See Blood and oil, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2000), http://www.economist.com/node/288515#print.
51
See Bruce Sterling, The Oil of the 21st Century Is, Uh, Oil, WIRED (Oct. 31, 2007, 7:19 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2007/10/the-oil-of-the/.
52
See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and
TTP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011).
53
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
54
VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural Heritage and the
Globalization of Intellectual Property, (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working
Paper No. 04-19, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=596921.
55
See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (Picador 2000); see also
CHRISTINE HAROLD, OURSPACE: RESISTING THE CORPORATE CONTROL OF CULTURE (2007).
56
WTO History Project, https://depts.washington.edu/wtohist/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017).
57
Michael Mukasey, Attorney Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General
Michael B. Mukasey at the Tech. Museum of Innovation (Mar. 28, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag_speech_080328.html.
58
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1084 (1997); Peter
S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS
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also marked an evolution in the racialized approaches to handling
knowledge produced by people of color. We therefore situate the rise of
intellectual property maximalism and “information feudalism”59 through
the lenses of racial capitalism and neoliberalism, both of which are
helpful in making race visible in a legal regime which purports to
regulate knowledge production in race neutral ways. In invoking the
term racial capitalism,60 we refer to the work of Cedric Robinson to
understand how intellectual property’s economic structure is “always
already” raced.61 As Robinson writes, “The historical development of
world capitalism was influenced in a most fundamental way by the
particularistic forces of racism and nationalism.”62 He continues:
Racialism . . . ran deep in the bowels of Western culture, negating its
varying social relations of production and distorting their inherent
contradictions. The comprehension of the particular configuration of
racist ideology and Western culture has to be pursued historically
through successive eras of violent domination and social extraction
that directly involved European peoples during the better part of two
millennia. Racialism insinuated not only medieval, feudal, and
capitalist social structures, forms of property, and modes of
production, but as well the very values and traditions of
consciousness through which the peoples of these ages came to
understand their worlds and their experiences.63

In essence, capitalism—an enterprise racialized at its core and
inception64—progressed in ways which magnified and exacerbated the
1600 129 (Boudewjin Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 2000).
59
PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2007).
60
CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION 9
(2000). While we are aware of Nancy Leong’s article, Racial Capitalism, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2151
(2013), we choose here to return to Robinson, whose work predates Leong’s and began a long
conversation about the relationship between radical Blackness and Marxism. His groundbreaking
work is being taken up in contemporary contexts today in ways we believe should be centered in
thinking about intellectual property in particular.
61
Here, we call upon Louis Althusser’s discussion of interpellation of subjects, to argue that
intellectual property law does not simply hail subjects but racial subjects under its racialized
understandings of knowledge production, protection, and circulation. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER,
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2001); see also, RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY (Ian
Haney López ed., 2007) (invoking Althusser in explaining the hailing of racialsubjects).
62
For a discussion of neoliberalism, see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM
(2007). In a recent interview in the Jacobin, Harvey explains: “I’ve always treated neoliberalism
as a political project carried out by the corporate capitalist class as they felt intensely threatened
both politically and economically towards the end of the 1960s into the 1970s. They desperately
wanted to launch a political project that would curb the power of labor.” Bjarke Skaerlund
Risager, Neoliberalism is a Political Project: An Interview with David Harvey, THE JACOBIN
(July 23, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/david-harvey-neoliberalism-capitalismlabor-crisis-resistance/.
63
ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 66.
64
See, e.g., EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE
REMAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2014).
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racialization of intellectual property economies. The connection
between race and intellectual property is certainly not new, but it has
evolved with the coincident ascendance of the technology economy and
intellectual property maximalism. We are not attempting to articulate
the master narrative of race and intellectual property. Nor do we intend
a comprehensive history of the decades before Critical Race IP
scholarship began to take root. Rather, we wish to narrate, in broad
strokes, an unfolding of events in which race, capitalism, and
intellectual property set the stage for Critical Race IP, whose name and
characteristic themes we elaborate upon in Part II of this article.
A. The Rise of the Intellectual Property Economy
Ash Amin writes that “there is an emerging consensus in the social
sciences that the period since the mid-1970s represents a transition from
one distinct phase of capitalist development to a new phase.” 65 Whether
described as “post-Fordism,” “post-industrialism,” “post-modernism,”
or any number of other terms, the new phase of capitalism,66 with its
neoliberal characteristics, ideological rejection of industrial production
as the primary engine for the US economy, embrace of flexible labor,
and trade in knowledge is one that encourages the creation, protection,
and valuation of intellectual properties.67 In the post-Fordist world,
65

Ash Amin, Introduction, in POST-FORDISM: A READER, supra note 38, at 1.
Id.
67
See, e.g., W. Ron Gard & Elizabeth Townsend Gard, The Present (User-Generated Crisis) Is
the Past (1909 Copyright Act): An Essay Theorizing the “Traditional Contours of Copyright”
Language, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455, 481–82 (2011) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted):
The fissures that appeared in the system in these postwar decades by the early 1970s
became full ruptures, and quite quickly the modernist economic configuration of
Fordism gave way. Since that time a new configuration has been emergent, a
postmodernist, post-Fordist configuration some have termed ‘flexible accumulation’
but is more commonly recognized by the general term ‘globalization.’ In this period,
production and consumption of goods has continued to expand even as they have
become ever more adaptable, drawing more and more parts of the world into the
market system, while the major bases of manufacturing have been relocated to cheaper
labor markets around the globe. Labor in the United States in particular, but also in
other fully-developed industrialized nations, increasingly has become information and
service sector based, while the cultural experience in these countries increasingly has
become one of consumption. The manufacture of goods occurs almost invisibly and the
appearance of those goods infinitely arrayed on store shelves seems to happen almost
magically. . . .[T]he cultural experience of dematerialization presently felt in some
locations is the result of the global system’s spatial configuration and distribution of
production and consumption. There is no question that more material goods than ever
before are being produced. While clear distinctions between Fordist and post-Fordist
economic configurations can be drawn, both recognizably are spatio-temporal
formations organized to manage mass production, and, as such, can be traced back to
the transformations at the end of the nineteenth century when these activities were
initiated. There is little doubt that the individual experience of cultural change
occurring at the end of the nineteenth century must have been profound. The spatial
redistribution of cultural activities coupled with the sudden and growing pervasiveness
66
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America became a net exporter of information for the first time in its
existence, as it shifted from a manufacturing-based to an informationbased economy.68
Accelerating pushes for privatization and deregulation in the 1980s
implicated intellectual property as well as its theoretical opposite, the
public domain. As the desire to own information increased, so too did
conflicts over the scope and contents of the public domain. In their 2002
book, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?,
Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite articulate the competing
considerations as represented by distinct constituencies: “visionaries
and entrepreneurs who . . . want ever stronger and more rigorously
policed international standards of intellectual property” and those who
recognize that “[c]opying and imitation are central to our processes of
learning and the acquisition of skills. . . . The creator of innovation is
also always the borrower of ideas and information from others.”69 They
further argue that the move towards more and stronger intellectual
property protection has resulted in a “transfer of knowledge assets from
the intellectual commons into private hands.”70 In essence, we have
entered the era of the mass privatization of knowledge, an era in which
information is increasingly treated as an excludable good with the
characteristics of real property and all too often managed by unregulated
markets.
Part of what motivated and continues to inspire the insistence upon
increasingly more IP protection is technological development. As
Jessica Litman and Jane Ginsburg note in the copyright context, this
assertion of the need for expanded IP protection in light of technological
advancement is not new.71 In fact, that assertion continues apace with

of material goods must have naturally led to a manifestation of value that was
intricately bound up with material qualities. However, as subsequent historical spatial
configurations through the twentieth century and up to the present show, what
ultimately proves more fundamental than the material state of culture, even as material
elements remain significant and influential, is a society’s exchangist practices, or its
manner of circulation.
See Aoki, supra note 27.
68
See David Nimmer, The Impact of Berne on United States Copyright Law, 8 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 27 (1989).
69
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 2. Note that Drahos and Braithwaite are
conflating authors with copyright owners. While they are in great company in doing so, this
conflation is often quite problematic. See Deidré A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should
Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016).
70
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 2–3.
71
Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 61, 65–
66 (2002) (reviewing JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001)); id. (footnotes omitted)
(“The self-destructive dance between copyright owners and technology entrepreneurs is hardly
new, as developments from piano rolls to videotape recorders attest. Nor is today’s invective
significantly more strident, as even a glance at the legislative history of the 1909 Act mechanical
license, or recollection of the furor over the Betamax, demonstrate.”).
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technological advancement.72 In the 1980s, this phenomenon of
demanding intellectual property protection in response to a
technological advancement was front and center in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.73 As such, James Lardner, the
journalist who wrote the definitive book on the history of Sony,74
dubbed the legal wrangling over the legality of Betamax the “VCR
Wars.”75 In the thirty years since the VCR Wars, much legal scholarship
has been written about Sony, both on its specific deficiencies and the
larger extent to which the law ought to change in response to specific
technological advancements.76 These critiques notwithstanding, the law
72

Id. at 66.
I think that recent years’ evolution, from the unfortunate lawsuit seeking to bar sales of
the ‘Rio’ portable MP3 player, to the misguided Hollings bill that would mandate
anticopying technology for consumer electronics, offers more of the same. It suggests
that some copyright owners, if not paranoid, are Pavlovian in their response to new
means of making copies or communicating works. I don’t mean to say that no
copyright-owning dog can learn new tricks, but neither do many copyright owners,
particularly the larger ones, appear to be leaping to unleash these technologies’
potential. In this debate, appearance counts a lot; and, whatever their conduct in fact,
many copyright owners appear—or are portrayed by some vigorous detractors in the
academy and in the popular press—as hell-bent on stomping out both new technology
and the scientists and entrepreneurs behind it.
Id. See also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189–90 (2000) (“Each successive wave of new technology
was, we were told, so different, so challenging, so fundamentally new, that this body of law had
better adapt, and quick, or become obsolete.”).
73
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
74
Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 922 (2005).
75
See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE AND THE VCR WARS
(1987); see also PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE
INTERNET (2012).
76
As to the former, see, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 941, 943–44 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
Although Sony was the first Supreme Court decision to interpret the 1976 Copyright
Act, it cited neither the statute nor legislative history to delineate the scope of
contributory liability. Rather, on the basis of what it asserted as a ‘historic kinship
between the patent and copyright law,’ the Court engrafted an express provision from
the Patent Act of 1952 onto the Copyright Act of 1976. The provision, section 271(c)
of the Patent Act, provides that ‘whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States
. . . a material part of the [patented] invention, knowing the same to be especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as
a contributory infringer.’ Given that the comprehensive reform of the Copyright Act of
1976 was the result of nearly two decades of deliberation, it seems astonishing for the
‘Magna Carta for the technology age’ to be rooted not in that voluminous history but
instead handed down in a contemporaneous judicial decision. When Congress adopted
the Copyright Act, it could have easily turned to the 1952 Patent Act, where ‘both the
concept of infringement and the concept of contributory infringement are expressly
defined by statute.’ Instead, the legislative history of the Copyright Act reveals that
Congress rooted its considerations regarding contributory infringement elsewhere. This
Article reveals why the Court chose that unconventional path and thereby places the
Sony precedent in its proper legislative and jurisprudential perspective.
Id. Regarding the latter, see, e.g., Merges, supra note 72, at 2190 (“Detailed, technology-specific
amendments thus thwart, to some extent, the quasi-common-law process by which IP law is
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has indeed changed quite a bit to accommodate changes in technology
over those thirty years.77 Sheila Jasanoff’s theorization of “interactional
coproduction”78 is useful in conceptualizing the mutually constitutive
relationship between technology and intellectual property law. Writing
in the context of Science and Technology Studies, Jasanoff proposes
that epistemological approaches to technology emerge through an
interactional relationship with institutional and cultural knowledge.79
She argues, “scientific ideas and beliefs, and (often) associated
technological artifacts, evolve together with the representations,
identities, discourses, and institutions that give practical effect and
meaning to ideas and objects.”80 We can read Jasanoff’s framework
more broadly to understand how intellectual property law, technology,
and race coproduce one another and facilitate the development of new
forms of biopolitics.81 In other words, intellectual property law’s
orientation to technology shapes and is shaped by structures of race and
capitalism in a way that informs state management over life and bodies.
Perhaps the most striking change to copyright law since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony is the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), which David Nimmer goes so far as to call
“nonsense on stilts.”82 It may also be fairly characterized as the most
immediate and consequential change to copyright law in the United
States to be specifically spurred by a particular technological
advancement—the Internet.83 In the nearly two decades since the
passage of the DMCA, many IP scholars have criticized it.84 The
primary critique of the DMCA has been that it curtails fair use and
thereby infringes upon the First Amendment rights of users.85 Though
elaborated. The recent erosion of what might be termed ‘legislative slack’ is hardly surprising.
Much more money is at stake in IP legislation than in the past. With higher stakes comes greater
desire to nail down the details of protection—and greater reluctance to leave important issues to
the courts. Economic theory and common sense both predict as much: more specific, highly
elaborated property rights are worth lobbying for when the assets they cover are more valuable.”).
77
See generally David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233,
1242 (2004) for a discussion of those technological changes.
78
Sheila Jasanoff, Ordering Knowledge, ordering society, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE 13 (Sheila
Jasanoff ed. 2004).
79
Id.
80
Co-Production, SHEILA JASANOFF, http://sheilajasanoff.org/research/co-production (last visited
Oct. 9, 2017)(emphasis in original).
81
See, generally, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE
DE FRANCE 1978-79 (ed. Michel Senellart, et. al. 2004).
82
Nimmer, supra note 77, at 1342 (citation omitted). New dot coms like Google, Amazon, and
Facebook also changed the face of American capitalism. However, given the historical period we
are highlighting here, i.e., the 1970s through the 1990s, we have left the intellectual property
issues that their business models raise for another day.
83
Id. at 1375 (“With such sorry results, it is useful to reflect on the exigency that compelled
Congress to adopt the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The Internet was then very much on
Congress’ mind.”).
84
See, e.g., id.
85
See generally Marc J. Randazza, Lenz v. Universal: A Call to Reform Section 512(f) of the
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there have been some instances in which courts refused to recognize
new or broader IP rights,86 the trend has definitely been towards more
expansive IP protection.87
Similar trends are evident in other areas of intellectual property
law. As copyright protection was expanding through legislation such as
the DMCA, trademarks were becoming increasingly important in the
negotiation of identity. Rosemary Coombe notes the role of trademarks
in identity formation as well as national identity formation. She writes,
referring to Michael Warner’s work on public spheres, “‘we have brand
names all over us.’ Trademarks, [Warner] suggests, are constitutive
parts of a public sphere—constructing a common discourse to bind the
subject to the nation and to its markets.”88 With the acceleration of
globalization and the rise of free trade, brands became increasingly
valuable commodities separate from the products that they marked.
Benjamin Barber’s concept of “McWorld” describes globalization’s
tendency to produce interconnected markets, notably markets in which
trademarked products can circulate. As he notes, companies such as
Nike, Microsoft, Apple, and Genentech, all of which grew considerably
in the 1970s and 1980s, “represent a new form of economic power.”89
The structural changes associated with neoliberal capitalism, including
President Ronald Reagan’s moves toward deregulation, criminalization,
and stronger trademark and copyright laws, ushered in, as Naomi Klein
contends, a new era of “trademark harassment.”90 The “cultural and
linguistic privatization”91 of the moment fueled the move to a
contemporary age in which brands are valuable commodities even apart
from the products to which they are attached. Notably, Reagan signed
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 which was an early, though
relatively narrow, step toward criminalizing intellectual property
violations.92 One 1984 law review article proclaimed: “Commercial
trademark counterfeiting in the United States is a problem which
threatens to go out of control.”93 Claims such as this one fueled
maximalist trademark and unfair competition policy by asserting that
DMCA and to Strengthen Fair Use, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 743 (2016).
86
See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
87
DEBORA J. HALBERT, THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS OF
CULTURAL CREATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (2014).
88
Rosemary J. Coombe, Marking Difference in American Commerce: Trademarks and Alterity at
Century’s End, 19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 105, 105 (1996) (In an early
commentary on the connections between trademark and race, Coombe notes that “[s]uch legal
forms always invite encounters with alterity.”).
89
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 54 (2001).
90
Klein, supra note 55, at 177.
91
Id.
92
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012).
93
Robert J. Abalos, Commercial Trademark Counterfeiting in the United States, the Third World
and Beyond: American and International Attempts to Stem the Tide, 5 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
151, 151 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
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the status quo constituted under-protection.94
In the context of patent law, new scientific discoveries and
globalization, especially after the negotiation of TRIPS in the mid1990s, drove the extraction of potentially valuable biological resources
for the development of new drugs, often from the developing world, and
experimentation with gene therapies.95 Cases such as Diamond v.
Chakrabarty96 and Moore v. Regents of the University of California97
paved the way for the private ownership of biological materials.98 As
biotechnology flourished, courts applying Chakrabarty found and
continue to find plants, genetically modified mammals, and certain
types of genetic material to be patentable subject matter.99 The
pushback against the monetization of such materials was and remains
tremendous. Critiques of biopiracy100 and the exploitation of
individuals’ biological material for monetary gain have continued to
gain traction even today.101
The push for more protection and related critiques extended to
other areas of intellectual property law, such as rights of publicity and
trade secrets, as well.102 The move toward intellectual property
maximalism across bodies of law prompted urgent questions about the
94

Id. For a general discussion of maximalist trademark policy, see, e.g., Coombe, supra note 88;
Klein, supra note 55.
95
See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000).
96
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
97
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
98
For a brief discussion of ownership in biological and genetic materials, see, e.g., Osagie K.
Obasogie,
Your
Body,
Their
Property,
BOS.
REV.
(Sept.
30,
2013),
http://bostonreview.net/us/obasogie-gene-patent-myriad-moore.
99
For a general overview of these developments, see Jane M. Marciniszyn, What Has Happened
Since Chakrabarty?, 2 J.L. & HEALTH 141 (1988). For the patentability of plants and animals, see
Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, From Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for Evolutionary
Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505 (2000); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (Supreme Court faced the question of whether human
genes are patentable and held that isolated DNA is not patentable subject matter while
synthetically-created DNA is patent eligible.).
100
Shiva, supra note 54.
101
Joseph M. Healy, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the DoctorPatient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 42 MERCER
L. REV. 989, 990 (1991) (observing that “it is impossible to overlook the extent to which
medicine, once viewed respectfully as an artful science, has assumed the characteristics of a
business and, as a consequence, finds itself increasingly under the critical scrutiny of its
customers and its regulators.”).
102
Vanna White sued Samsung claiming their commercial depicting a robot wearing a wig and a
dress and posed beside a Wheel of Fortune board infringed upon her right of publicity. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision denying Samsung summary judgment has been read as expanding the scope of
intellectual property law considerably, through protection of property rights in evoking a
particular celebrity. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Arlen
W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control,
45 KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997); see also Rosemary J. Coombe, The Celebrity Image and Cultural
Identity: Publicity Rights and the Subaltern Politics of Gender, 14 DISCOURSE 59 (1992), for a
discussion of celebrity and property rights.
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relationship between intellectual properties, race, and inequality,
including the extent to which copyright, trademark, patent, right of
publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition law shape racial
categories and operate as potential sites for renegotiating racial power
relations. If Drahos and Brathwaite are right in arguing that we are
steadily moving toward a situation in which relatively few global
conglomerates are in possession of the vast majority of the intellectual
property resources,103 then there is no question that we are also moving
toward the further marginalization of those who are currently situated at
the edges of the intellectual property system. Scholars considering the
power hierarchies inherent in intellectual property regimes formed the
core of Critical IP literature. In the next section, we contextualize those
scholars within the larger Critical Legal Studies movement.
B. From CLS to Critical IP
In 1982, Margaret Jane Radin, in a landmark piece entitled
“Property and Personhood,” made the argument that fully-realized
personhood requires access to and control over at least some “personal
property.”104 Her Hegelian argument offers a rights-based justification
for ensuring the stability and security of property that is integral to
personhood.105 Radin’s argument is an appropriate place to begin
because it engages and informs many of the themes that emerged in the
1970s and 1980s in the areas of CLS, Feminist Jurisprudence, and CRT,
including how law might become a more economically and socially just
enterprise.106 Specifically, the interrogation of property as both a
cultural and racial construct formed the backbone of the scholarly
innovations that followed years later in the area of Critical Race IP.
Revealing possibilities for reinterpreting property paved the way for
new and radical claims about rethinking and remaking intellectual
property.107 Around the same time as Radin published her
103

DRAHOS WITH BRATHWAITE, supra note 59, at 3 (“These hands belong to media
conglomerates and integrated life sciences corporations rather than individual scientists and
authors. The effect of this, we argue, is to raise levels of private monopolistic power to dangerous
global heights, at a time when states, which have been weakened by the forces of globalization,
have less capacity to protect their citizens from the consequences of the exercise of this power.”).
104
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
105
Id.
106
Because the categories of CLS, Feminist Jurisprudence, and CRT are often overlapping, we
use one footnote here. Radin’s Property and Personhood has been cited, according to Google
Scholar, 2,018 times as of May 12, 2018 at 11:58 P.M. Some of those landmark pieces which
engage her work in order to get at questions of equity, justice, gender, and race in law include:
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (reprt. ed. 1991);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (9th prtg.
1994); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 400 (1987).
107
See, e.g., Paul K. Saint-Amour, Your Right to What’s Mine: On Personal Intellectual
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groundbreaking work, CLS and civil rights scholars were facing
considerable critique from a subset of scholars interested specifically in
the racial hierarchies embedded in the law and in pushing civil rights
discourse in a more progressive direction. These contentions would
form the basis of the Critical Race Theory movement.
CRT, according to Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller,
and Kendall Thomas, “embraces a movement of left scholars, most of
them scholars of color, situated in law schools, whose work challenges
the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented
in American legal culture and, more generally, in American society as a
whole.”108 CRT emerged from critiques of the Civil Rights Movement
and its rights-based approach to equality in the United States.109 While
CLS was making many important interventions in the areas of class and
power, many found its analysis of race to be inadequate. Scholars
particularly interested in questions of racial hierarchy, who had been
attending CLS meetings, began to meet independently of CLS and
articulate a progressive legal perspective that centered race as a
necessary and important starting point for inquiries into inequality.110
Those early meetings were the beginning of what would become CRT.
It did not take long for first generation CRT scholars to turn to questions
of intellectual property.111
Rosemary Coombe, who had been developing a framework for
studying the intersections between culture and intellectual property,
often in the context of race, became one of the first scholars to focus
attention on the racial and colonial dimensions of copyrights and
trademarks.112 Then, in 1996, Keith Aoki authored a piece entitled
“(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship.”113 The article, one of the earliest to
expressly invoke CRT in the context of intellectual property law,
advances an interdisciplinary critique of attempts to globalize
intellectual property rights, particularly copyright, without attending to

Property, 25 LAW & LITERATURE 103 (2013) (arguing from Radin that users may have personal
interests in copyrighted works).
108
Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xiii.
109
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (serving as a starting point for CRT).
110
Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xviii–xix. We note that, in many ways, this break with CLS
signified a symbolic and ideological break with the mainstream white, American liberalism that
had failed African Americans.
111
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, The Stakes of Intellectual Property Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 259 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
112
Coombe’s early articles, which make up much of her 1998 book, pushed for critical/ cultural
legal studies, one which examined racial and colonial politics. See e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The
Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural
Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 249 (1993).
113
Aoki, supra note 27.
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the politics of local development.114 At the core of Aoki’s argument is
an observation that the one size fits all model of international
intellectual property, animated by the figure of the Romantic Author
who is capable of “original” work, speciously justifies maximalist
copyright policy based in fictions of universality that are actually
grounded in European-ness.115 He writes:
As the discourse of authorship produces a particular type of
intellectual property owner (the author), the discourse of
globalization produces a very particular and peculiar representation
of the globe. At their intersection, the discourses of authorship and
globalization privilege at least six dominant . . . norms within AngloAmerican legal thought (as Rosemary Coombe delineates): (1) a
clear distinction between categories of public and private; (2) a sharp
distinction between property and speech; (3) an Enlightenmentderived, linear model of progress; (3) a deeply held commitment to
and belief in a marketplace of ideas; (5) a faith (at least up until fairly
recently) in the transparency of language; and (6) a foundational
belief in the commensurability of all things, that is, that all things
may be reduced to a common metric understood by all . . . .116

Aoki’s essay presages the major themes that progressive
intellectual property scholars have been now considering for two
decades, including Eurocentrism and inequity, the Enlightenment, and
distributive justice. While authorship is only one factor in progressive
intellectual property, Aoki’s work offers a starting point for
contemplating various strands of critique that have developed over the
years. We turn to those themes in the next section, focusing on how
scholars like Coombe, Aoki, and others laid the groundwork for Critical
Race IP.
Aoki’s piece was an early example of what Tehranian describes as
Critical IP scholarship.117 While Tehranian’s consideration of Critical IP
as an area of study is important, we believe it equally important to place
questions of race, racialization, and racism at the center of
considerations of intellectual property. In Tehranian’s formulation, race,
though a sufficient marker of Critical IP, is not a necessary axis of
analysis.118 We contend here that race is an exceedingly important site
114

Id.
Id.
116
Id. at 1341–42.
117
Tehranian, supra note 40. In the interest of articulating the actual provenance of the term,
“critical intellectual property,” as we understand it, we note that the first use of the term of which
we are aware was in an article by Laura A. Foster. See Laura A. Foster, Situating Feminism,
Patent Law, and the Public Domain, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 262 (2011).
118
Tehranian, supra note 40, at 1244 (broadly defining “‘critical IP theory’ . . . as the
deconstruction of trademark, copyright, and patent laws and norms in light of existing power
relationships to better understand the role of intellectual property in both maintaining and
115
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for intellectual property analysis for which existing considerations of
power, inequality, or distributive justice simply do not fully account.
Because Critical IP proceeds from a rather broad set of values to assess
the relationship between intellectual property and, in Tehranian’s
words, “subordination,”119 we believe that such a framework cannot do
the work of questioning racial liberalism and supplanting
Eurocentricism that is central to CRT. As such, Critical IP may replicate
some of the same oversights of CLS, inadvertently eliding questions of
race.120
Valdes, et al. in describing future directions of CRT argue that
CRT engages three principle ideas: (1) race consciousness is necessary
to address structural racism; (2) racism is not the work of a few “badapple[s]” but the result of systemic institutional and ideological
discrimination; and (3) intersectionality is important to any critical race
analysis.121 We explicitly describe and advocate for a Critical Race IP in
which scholars bring these principal ideas to bear upon intellectual
property. At the Race + IP Conference in April 2017, we engaged in
many discussions which we believe to be only the tip of the iceberg in
terms of the potentially productive topics, issues, and insights that
theorizing Critical Race IP might yield. In the next section, we elaborate
on the themes that we see as anchoring the development of Critical
Race IP up until this point and directing its development into the future.
II. LOCATING CRITICAL RACE IP
In the first plenary session at Race + IP 2017, Boatema Boateng
posed the question “why Critical Race IP?”122 In part, her query
highlighted the need for multiple types of theoretical inquiry into
intellectual property’s relationships to race and social justice. It further
suggested the possibility of using CRT to inform the study of
intellectual property without formally naming the resulting scholarship.
It also asks us to consider why investment in Critical Race IP as a

perpetuating social hierarchy and subordination.”).
119
Id.
120
Cf. Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xiii–xiv (describing the oversights of CLS that, in part,
led to the development of CRT).
121
Valdes, et al., supra note 24, at 2.
122
Part of the “why Critical Race IP?” question involves distinguishing the title of the
conference, Race + IP, from our conceptualization of Critical Race IP. In contemplating the
inclusivity of the conference as well as its exploratory nature, we offered Race + IP as a
provocation to consider the aims, methods, and theories that the intersections of race and
intellectual property might produce. However, studying the intersections of race and intellectual
property does not necessarily involve addressing the questions that Valdes et al. focus on as
important to CRT. For instance, a study of the demographics of inventors of color may or may
not be invested in race-conscious or intersectional analysis of the intellectual property system.
We, therefore, offer Critical Race IP as a narrower inquiry, which while no less important than
Race + IP, poses a different set of questions with particular scholarly antecedents.
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named area of study is important. We believe naming Critical Race IP is
a vital move, not only because it aids in reflecting upon the connections
between the work of scholars writing about race, social justice, and
intellectual property but also because it creates material stakes in the
study of the intersections of those topics. With respect to the former,
identifying the themes that tie together works at the intersections of race
and intellectual property across disciplines lays the groundwork for
imagining new directions for future scholarship. With respect to the
latter, naming Critical Race IP quite literally brings into being a new
area of study in which new scholars as well as institutions can invest—
in material and ideological ways. Though we recognize the liabilities of
institutionalizing radical theoretical positions, naming and articulating
the stakes of Critical Race IP will bring important countervailing
benefits.
Naming practices are necessarily political. Whether in the context
of rejecting slave names in lieu of chosen names,123 refusing to
acknowledge the interests of groups in political negotiations by not
naming them,124 articulating new legal protections for age-old
wrongs,125 or developing new names for unprotected practices,126
123

Kimberly W. Benston, “I Yam what I Am”: Naming and Unnaming in Afro-American
Literature, 16 BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 1, 3 (1982) (citing MALCOLM X, MALCOLM X ON
AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (Merit Publishers 1967)).
Language—that fundamental act of organizing the mind’s encounter with an
experienced world—is propelled by a rhythm of naming: It is the means by which the
mind takes possession of the named, at once fixing the named as irreversibly Other and
representing it in crystalized isolation from all conditions of externality. Malcolm
Little, named by the master/father who banished him to his marginal existence, was in
some measure the slave his given name signified; a ‘so-called Negro,’ he owned
nothing: ‘As long as you allow them to call you what they wish you don’t know who
you really are. You can’t lay claim to any name, any home, any destiny, that will
identify you as something you should be, as someone you should become: a brother
among brothers.’
Id.; see also GRANT FARRED, WHAT’S MY NAME: BLACK VERNACULAR INTELLECTUALS (2003)
(on the importance of naming in black political tradition); Derek H. Alderman, Place, Naming
and the Interpretation of Cultural Landscapes, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO
HERITAGE AND IDENTITY 195, 201 (Brian Graham & Peter Howard eds., 2008); Ben L. Martin,
From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming, 106 POL. SCI. Q.
83, 83 (1991) (“Names can be more than tags; they can convey powerful imagery. So naming—
proposing, imposing, and accepting names—can be a political exercise.”).
124
Danielle Endres, The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American
Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision, 6 COMM. &
CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 39, 50 (2009) (“Instead of explicitly naming American Indians as
‘savages’ (a common strategy identified in the scholarship on rhetorical colonialism), this
strategy names American Indian nations as part of the US public by denying government-togovernment negotiations, forcing participation in the public comment period and describing all
opponents as public critics.”).
125
See generally Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 1–2 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel
eds., 2004).
Sexual harassment is a social practice. Social practices have lives, institutional lives
and semiotic lives. And so social practices like sexual harassment have histories.
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among many other examples, it is clear that the choice of when and how
to name is a significant one. This is particularly true in institutional
contexts.
One context in which naming consistently comes up is in
conversations about academic disciplines and non-disciplines.
Discussions about naming Cultural Studies are illustrative. While there
are still relatively few institutionalized Cultural Studies programs, the
latter retains its identity as an interdisciplinary movement or network,
much like CRT. We advocate for a similar path for Critical Race IP as a
means of identifying the political project that scholars are undertaking
and facilitating more study in that space. An early piece on the
importance of naming in Cultural Studies notes:
Yet there are important pressures to define. There is the little daily
politics of the college or the school-not so little since jobs, resources
and opportunities for useful work are involved. Cultural studies has
won real spaces here and they have to be maintained and
extended . . . terms. We need definitions of cultural studies to
struggle effectively in these contexts, to make claims for resources,
to clarify our minds in the rush and muddle of everyday work, and to
decide priorities for teaching and research127

Names and definitions provide practical grounding and centralized
focus, “if not as a unity at least as a whole.”128 They can bring
cohesiveness to an intellectual project, in a manner that grounds it.
Carbado suggests the same in “Critical What What?” Quoting
Crenshaw, he writes, “‘what is in play here is less of a definitive
articulation of CRT and more of socio-cultural narrative of CRT.’ In the
context of offering this narrative, Crenshaw describes CRT as an
intellectual and political dynamic that is constantly being
Considering sexual harassment in historical perspective allows us to ask some
fundamental questions about the nature of the practice, the terms in which it has been
contested, and the rules and rhetorics by which law constrains—or enables-—the
conduct in question. My object in these pages is to invite reflection, not only about
sexual harassment, but also about the law of sex discrimination itself. It is only quite
recently that sexual harassment acquired the name of ‘sexual harassment’ and was
prohibited as a form of ‘sex discrimination.’ By examining the process through which a
persistent and pervasive practice came to be recognized as discrimination ‘on the basis
of sex,’ we learn much about what law does when it recognizes discrimination. Clearly,
this act of recognition was a momentous one. For the first time in history, women
extracted from law the means to fight a practice with which they had been struggling
for centuries.
Id.
126

Anjali Vats, (Dis)owning Bikram: Decolonizing vernacular and dewesternizing restructuring
in the yoga wars, 13 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 325 (2016); see also Chidi
Oguamanam, Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative Legal Interventions,
and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489 (2008).
127
Johnson, supra note 9, at 41.
128
Id. (emphasis in original).
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reconstituted.”129 An approach similar to the one that unfolded in
Cultural Studies and CRT is useful in the context of Critical Race IP.
Naming Critical Race IP is important for focusing conversations,
theoretically and conceptually, and marshalling institutional resources.
Moreover, it is helpful for bringing new scholars and activists into the
fold. Nevertheless, simultaneously thinking of Critical Race IP as a
network of scholars who engage intellectual properties through the lens
of race is a helpful way of capturing its conceptual dynamism and
constant evolution and avoiding stagnancy or fixity.
Naming Critical Race IP is also conceptually important in
delineating how CRT can illuminate the study of intellectual properties.
For instance, the name Critical Race IP points to how whiteness
operates not only as property but as intellectual property. It is
impossible to speak of CRT without invoking Cheryl Harris’s essay
“Whiteness as Property,” which celebrated its twentieth anniversary in
2013. Harris’s piece is central to CRT, as well as the study of
intellectual property and race, in part because it focuses on the
significant and complex relationship between race and property
rights.130 Harris highlights how whiteness operates as property,
conferring a bundle of social and political rights that are exclusively
granted to those who read as white.131 Harris’s piece now informs a
wide body of interdisciplinary scholarship which interrogates legal
definitions of property in the United States, the relationship of those
definitions to race and personhood, and the ethical considerations of
such investments.132 The phrase “Critical Race IP” points to the value of
CRT’s core themes, particularly its acknowledgment of intellectual
property’s investments in whiteness. Analogizing Harris, white racial
identity confers not only a bundle of property rights but also intellectual
property rights.133 Put succinctly, we might rewrite Harris to state that
this Article “investigates the relationships between concepts of race and
[intellectual] property and reflects on how rights in [intellectual]
property are contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with
race.”134 Whiteness brings with it a set of privileges and presumptions in
the context of intellectual property: whites have historically constructed
129

Carbado, supra note 14, at 1601.
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). We also note that
during Race + IP 2017, the plenary sessions continually returned to Harris’s essay because of its
central importance to the topic at hand.
131
Id. at 1725–28.
132
As of the date of publication of this Article, shepardizing Whiteness as Property returns 523
sources, on topics related to feminism, queer theory, and race. A Google scholar search of the
work shows 4,016 citing sources as of May 12, 2018 at 11:59 P.M, further demonstrating its
incredible influence outside of the legal academy.
133
See DEIDRÉ A. KELLER & ANJALI VATS, CRT-ICIZING COPYRIGHT (Mar. 28, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895866.
134
Harris, supra note 130, at 1714.
130
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information regimes in ways which devalue the knowledge and
practices of non-whites;135 whites have historically held the power and
authority to determine the legal structures which govern intellectual
property rights;136 whites have historically crafted legal doctrines which
favor the protection of Western understandings of creativity; 137 and
whites largely continue to manage domestic and international
intellectual property rights regimes.138
The remainder of this section focuses on articulating not only how
Harris’s argument regarding property’s racial underpinnings in
“Whiteness as Property” is, in many ways, analogous to intellectual
property but also the landscape of the area of study we call Critical Race
IP. We first explore the meaning of “race” and “IP” in the context of
Critical Race IP. We then turn to central themes in Critical Race IP
scholarship, fleshing out their importance in overall discussions of race
and intellectual property as well as future conversations. We identify
seven themes which consistently emerge in discussions of race and
intellectual property: (1) defining intellectual property; (2) intellectual
property’s stories; (3) traditional knowledge; (4) the public domain; (5)
framing and reframing infringement, counterfeiting, and piracy; (6)
access to knowledge (A2K); and (7) Critical Race IP in action.
A. What is the “Race” in Critical Race IP?139
Race is the socially constructed category used to describe and
ascribe value to phenotypic differences between individuals.140 As
demonstrated by scientific advances in genetics, such as the completion
of the Human Genome Project, there is no biological basis for treating
135

See, e.g., DEBORA J. HALBERT, RESISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2005) 150 (“Today’s
biopiracy is simply the extension of the logic behind the doctrine of discovery.”).
136
See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 315 (2003).
137
Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2379 (2009); see also THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 2d prtg.
1999); RAYVON FOUCHÉ, BLACK INVENTORS IN THE AGE OF SEGREGATION: GRANVILLE T.
WOODS, LEWIS H. LATIMER & SHELBY J. DAVIDSON (2003); James Boyle, Foreword: The
Opposite of Property?, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003).
138
See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765 (2002).
139
This subheading and section is inspired by Hall’s essay “What is the ‘black’ in black popular
culture?” in which he contends that blackness itself is hegemonically negotiated. He writes,
“mistaking what is historical and cultural for what is natural, biological, and genetic. The moment
the signifier “black” is torn from its historical, cultural, and political embedding and lodged in a
biologically constituted racial category, we valorize, by inversion, the very ground of the racism
we are trying to deconstruct.” Stuart Hall, What is the “black” in black popular culture?, 20 SOC.
JUST. 104 (2009).
140
See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898

KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

760

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

6/4/2018 6:00 PM

[Vol. 36:3

race as a meaningful category, and, therefore, no biological basis for
deeming some people “superior” and others “inferior.”141 Rather, as
Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue, racial difference is socially
and materially constructed through racial projects—policy decisions
based on historically contingent understandings of the meaning of race.
In Omi and Winant’s formulation, the term racial formation describes
“the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created,
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed”142 specifically through
“historically situated projects in which human bodies and social
structures are represented and organized.”143 Legislative and judicial
definitions of race, as Ian Haney Lopez describes in his groundbreaking
text White by Law, were and continue to be integral in rhetorically
defining racial categories as well as materially shaping race through the
grant and denial of rights and privileges.144 That said, while the
definitions of race we engage here are useful starting points for thinking
about racial categories and how they are constituted, they do not help us
to situate race in particular historical contexts or in specific academic
and activist contexts. We now turn to the question of how we might
specifically think of the “race” in Critical Race IP.
Race is, in Stuart Hall’s terms, a “floating signifier.” 145 It does not
have a fixed meaning; rather, it is term with no clear referent whose
meaning is contingent on time, place, and context.146 To speak of race in
CRT or Critical Race IP, then, is not to speak of a static category; it is to
speak of an item that is contextually defined. In CRT, race originally
centered on black/white binaries in a post-Civil Rights context.147 That
is not to say that Race Crits did not recognize the existence of race in
other spaces, simply that they chose to theorize it primarily vis-à-vis
Black/white binaries. Subsequent conversations in CRT resulted in a
broader theorization of law and race, through studies of Asians as model

141

ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION
AFTER THE GENOME 13 (2016) (footnote omitted) (“Under the flashing glare of the international
press corps’ cameras, President Bill Clinton—flanked by Venter and National Human Genome
Research Institute director Francis Collins, and with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain joining
in via remote video—breathlessly declared that ‘one of the great truths to emerge from this
triumphant expedition inside the human genome is that in genetic terms, all human beings,
regardless of race, are more than 99.9 percent the same . . . .’”).
142
OMI & WINANT, supra note 142, at 55–56.
143
Id (emphasis in original).
144
IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1997) (For
instance, Lopez describes how anti-miscegenation laws, by preventing interracial mixing, affected
the physical and biological realities of those who procreated.).
145
Stuart Hall, Lecture at the Media Education Foundation: Race, the Floating Signifier (1997),
(transcript available at www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Stuart-Hall-Race-the-Floating-SignifierTranscript.pdf).
146
Id.
147
Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xiv.
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minorities,148 Latinos as beyond the black/white binary, 149 and racial
categories as geographically and temporally bounded social
constructions.150 Moreover, the latter studies resulted in crossdisciplinary and interdisciplinary conversations about the investments of
the legal academy and its power structures in whiteness. 151 The race in
CRT is therefore unfixed. It is a signifier with constantly changing
meaning which evolves based on the everyday practices of individuals,
including scholars, and the cultural and historical conditions of the
times. Echoing Carbado, we might imagine the race in CRT as a verb—
one which describes the process through which institutional and cultural
practices, including in law and the academy, make, constitute, and undo
racial categories. The race in contemporary CRT scholarship might be
more succinctly described as a floating signifier which refers to the
tendency of culture and institutions to operate in ways that, implicitly or
explicitly, protect the interests of whiteness at the expense of people of
color instead of making space for radical equality built on foundations
of restorative justice.
We imagine the race in Critical Race IP similarly. Instead of
focusing on the social construction of differences based on skin color,
we invoke race to describe the many ways intellectual property
discourses play a central role in the protection of whiteness. The study
of race in the context of intellectual properties must be an intersectional
enterprise, involving the coordinated examination of categories such as
gender, class, and sexual orientation.152 An originalist reading of the
race in Critical Race IP might limit analysis to only black/white binaries
in the United States or legal regimes around civil rights. However, such
a definition of race is both overly narrow and inconsistent with the
trajectory that CRT has taken over the past decade.
Instead, we encourage a reading of the race in Critical Race IP as a
broad intersectional and transnational category of analysis that leaves
space for discussions of the Global South with respect to distributive
justice, access to knowledge, and even neo-coloniality. Nikhil Pal

148

See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993); Keith Aoki,
“Foreign-ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and
Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (1996); Harvey Gee, Perspective:
Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by Asian Americans Within the Critical Race Theory
Movement, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 759 (1999).
149
See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Forward: Under Construction—LatCrit Consciousness,
Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997).
150
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the Third World in International
Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000).
151
Perry, supra note 20.
152
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
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Singh’s writing on the whiteness of police is instructive in thinking
about the landscape of the race in Critical Race IP:
Whiteness…does not issue directly from private property. It emerges
from the governance of property and its interests in relationship to
those who have no property and thus no calculable interests, and who
are therefore imagined to harbor a potentially criminal disregard for
propertied order.153

Studying the race in Critical Race IP entails mapping, theorizing,
and remaking understandings of the lawful and just governance of
intellectual property, which, like the police in the realm of embodied
relations, serves to normalize and reinforce whiteness. It further requires
asking who is imagined as a legitimate intellectual property owner and
who is envisioned as a threat to the (intellectual) propertied order.
Focusing on systems of governance of intellectual property and
narratives of transgression reveals the racial contours of intellectual
property and offers important starting points for reconceptualizing its
racial investments. We are not contending that we ought not
contemplate the meaning of race as a culturally constructed lens for
understanding and ascribing value to phenotypic difference, rather that
we must situate and contextualize that understanding of race, by and
through examination of intellectual property governance and the racial
stories which we consistently tell around copyrights, trademarks,
patents, and so on. Doing so allows us to locate race, not as a static
category, but an ever-changing one. We therefore understand the race in
Critical Race IP as invoking the spirit and thematic directions of CRT
scholarship, in a manner which attends to that area’s core tenets about
the investment of culturally constructed institutional regimes in directly
or indirectly advancing the interests of whiteness. As discussed through
individual themes below, not all questions of racial justice in intellectual
property have been previously invoked in CRT. However, insofar as
these themes involve questions of racial non-neutrality in intellectual
property and knowledge protection contexts, they are consonant with
the race in CRT.
B. What is the “IP” in Critical Race IP?
Traditionally, intellectual property means the laws of copyrights,
trademarks, patents, rights of publicity, trade secrets, and/or unfair
competition.154 Navigating intellectual property requires a broad
153

Nikhil Pal Singh, The Whiteness of Police, 66 AMERICAN QUARTERLY 1091 (2014).
PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2003).
154
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understanding of the interrelationships between and among these legal
doctrines and other areas of law including contracts, constitutional law,
and property. While this interrelatedness is not unique to IP, it is notable
considering Richard Stallman’s critique that intellectual property is a
“seductive mirage”155 through which content owners group together
types of law that are, in fact, very different and materially so.
While the “IP” in Critical Race IP is not intended to homogenize
the various types of intellectual property law, it nonetheless points to
the need to study intellectual property both as a mass noun through
which policy is obscured and the component parts of that mass noun.
Moreover, the work of intellectual property scholars, particularly those
concerned with social justice, increasingly reflects the reality that
copyrights, trademarks, patents, rights of publicity, trade secrets, and
claims of unfair competition are not simply legal regimes confined to
the realm of law but cultural objects that move through everyday life. 156
That is increasingly true given the growth of international intellectual
property regimes and appeals to human rights norms as a means of
protecting the interests of marginalized peoples. Untangling the cultural
implications of intellectual properties and intellectual property law, and
not simply the legal regimes themselves, is therefore central to the “IP”
in Critical Race IP.
Broadly framing “IP” encourages a thorough analysis of the ways
intellectual property law implicates race, at domestic and international
levels. This broad reading of “IP” is evident in Critical Race IP
scholarship. Each of the areas of intellectual property law we have
mentioned—copyright,157 trademark,158 patent,159 right of publicity,160
trade secret,161 and unfair competition162—has a healthy and growing
155

Richard Stallman, Did You Say “Intellectual Property”? It’s a Seductive Mirage, GNU
OPERATING SYS.: PHIL., http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2017).
156
COOMBE, supra note 28.
157
See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
MANDATE PALESTINE (2012); CAROLINE JOAN S. PICART, CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND
COPYRIGHT IN AMERICAN DANCE: WHITENESS AS STATUS PROPERTY (2013); ANTHEA KRAUT,
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT: RACE, GENDER, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN DANCE (2015); K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and
Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 365 (2008).
158
COOMBE, supra note 28; Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1601 (2010); David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual
Property, Commodification and Redemption, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (2005).
159
Nelson, supra note 141; DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS,
AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011); Jonathan Kahn,
Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual Property in
Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353 (2007).
160
See, e.g., Lateef Mtima, What’s Mine is Mine but What’s Yours is Ours: IP Imperialism, the
Right of Publicity, and Intellectual Property Social Justice in the Digital Information Age, 15
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 323 (2012).
161
See, e.g., Deepa Varadarajan, A Trade Secret Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge,
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 371 (2011).
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body of scholarship considering its relationship with race. We both
identify and encourage this broad reading of the “IP” in Critical Race IP
as a means of theorizing and remedying the many ways intellectual
properties are racially non-neutral and mutually constitutive of the
category of race and processes of racial formation.
C. (Un)bounding Critical Race IP
During Race + IP 2017, fifteen plenary speakers and several dozen
concurrent speakers presented papers speaking to the issues at the
intersections of race and intellectual property from a variety of
disciplinary vantage points.163 We do not endeavor to recap the
conference or create a comprehensive list of scholars whose work might
be defined as falling within the area of Critical Race IP. Instead, we are
interested in tracing themes that repeatedly arise at the intersections of
intellectual property, race, and social justice – at the conference and in
other scholarly writings – and highlighting the common tenets useful in
articulating Critical Race IP. We observe several consistent themes that
arise in the work of those concerned with intellectual properties not only
as tools for securing legal rights but also as cultural and racial
formations with which we engage every day. We have also observed
some core tenets that arise from these thematic engagements.
The themes we identify are not intended to (un)bound Critical
Race IP. Rather they are best read as a provisional and evolving
mapping of the existing work that might inform a Critical Race IP. This
spatial metaphor might be best read through the political geographyinspired framework Keith Aoki suggested for CRT.164 Where Aoki calls
for legal scholars to recognize and contest “the inertness and apparent
neutrality of space”165 such as the Third World, we attend to the
landscape of Critical Race IP scholarship, often written by “‘outsider’
scholars . . . many of whom are themselves space invaders of academia
at large.”166 Identifying and articulating the central themes of Critical
Race IP creates a conceptual overview of the spaces scholars who are
doing intersectional race work in intellectual property law: (1) have
occupied; (2) continue to occupy; (3) might occupy in the future; and
(4) have not yet attempted or succeeded in occupying. Such a
provisional mapping allows us to imagine a path forward, one in which
“the faces at the bottom” and “outsider” scholars in intellectual property
contexts are no longer simply “space invaders” but part of a multiverse
162

See, e.g., Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A
Reappraisal of the Tension between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United
States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769 (1999).
163
Vats et al., supra note 3.
164
Aoki, supra note 150.
165
Id. at 956.
166
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898

KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

2018]

6/4/2018 6:00 PM

CRITICAL RACE IP

765

of understandings about the creation and management of knowledge,
including through the making, evolution, and enforcement of law and its
engagements with race.
One way to anchor this provisional mapping is to consider how
Critical Race IP orients itself toward ideas of (intellectual) property and
personhood. Scholarship in race and intellectual property, like Harris’s
“Whiteness as Property,” has adopted questions about race, property,
and personhood as fundamental issues, asking how intellectual property
is defined, how it ought to be defined, and the racial and social justice
implications that flow from such definitions.167 A central issue in
Critical Race IP scholarship—one which might be called a fundamental
tenet of the interdisciplinary movement—is critical analysis of how
intellectual property does and should relate to conceptual personhood,
particularly for those that were not and are not, explicitly and/or
implicitly, considered to be fully human. Widely accepted definitions of
intellectual property emerge from Lockean understandings of property,
which dictate that engaging in the “sweat of the brow” entitles a person
to ownership of the fruits of his labors.168 Critical Race IP scholars not
only push against the sweat of the brow theory, they also reframe it in
ways that make different kinds of epistemological understandings of
creation possible. In many ways, the themes we identify are all
negotiations of a fundamental set of questions: Whose labor is valuable?
How is it valued? What systems underpin those definitions of labor?
And how do we alter and remake the systems that undervalue the
knowledge of people of color and maintain systems of white
supremacy?
For instance, Madhavi Sunder, in the piece “Property in
Personhood,” takes up Margaret Jane Radin’s argument from
“Personhood and Property” and theorizes some of the ways intellectual
property law can serve as a site for the assertion of property rights in
personhood in the context of traditional knowledge.169 Sunder again
engages such questions in “IP3,”170 in which she traces how intellectual

167

COOMBE, supra note 28; Madhavi Sunder, Property in Personhood, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW & CULTURE 164 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan
C. Williams, eds., 2005); Sunder, supra note 31.
168
See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 43 (C.B. Macpherson ed.
1980)(emphasis in original)(“An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and
another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without a doubt, of
the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is
worth 5l. and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from
it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth . . . [F]or it is not
barely the plough-man’s pains, the reaper’s and the thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat, is to be
counted into the bread we eat . . . .”).
169
Sunder, Property in Personhood, supra note 167; see also Radin, supra note 104.
170
Sunder, supra note 31.
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property can be used to protect “human flourishing.”171 Kristin
Carpenter, Angela Riley, and Sonia Katyal, in “In Defense of Property,”
also consider definitions of property and personhood in order to
advocate for broadening understanding of (intellectual) property to
account for the protection of traditional knowledge.172 These moves to
re-conceptualize the property in intellectual property are central to both
the race and intellectual property parts of Critical Race IP, in part
because, as we argued earlier, whiteness has operated as a marker of the
capacity and right to create and own property, including intellectual
property.173 These are helpful antecedents for thinking about how
Critical Race IP reframes questions that are otherwise taken for granted
in intellectual property law.
Related to questions of defining (intellectual) property are attempts
to redefine the scope of both. Coombe, for instance, writes about
interventions by Crazy Horse’s ancestors to invalidate the trademark for
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor through legal channels.174 Lovalerie King
identifies Alice Randall’s victory in publishing The Wind Done Gone as
an example of law and literature accommodating African American
memory.175 Richard Schur discusses the productive politics of hip-hop
culture and the racism of refusing to protect the work of black artists.176
Vats reads Marshawn Lynch’s trademarking of the name Beast Mode as
a move to claim intellectual property rights in his black body and
contest the narrative of the Black Beast.177 Minh-Ha T. Pham discusses
how extralegal disciplining of Asians in the context of fashion creates
racialized copynorms even in the absence of illegality. 178 These
examples, which only scratch the surface of discussions on the nature
and scope of relations among (intellectual) property and people of color,
demonstrate the centrality of questions of property and personhood in
tying together the interdisciplinary movement of Critical Race IP.
Conversations in this area continue to evolve, as people of color
theorize, enact, and perform new relationships to intellectual properties,
discursively and materially, thereby changing the material realities in
which they live.
171

Id. at 285.
Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J.
1022 (2009).
173
See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.
174
COOMBE, supra note 28.
175
LOVALERIE KING, RACE, THEFT, AND ETHICS: PROPERTY MATTERS IN AFRICAN AMERICAN
LITERATURE (2007).
176
RICHARD L. SCHUR, PARODIES OF OWNERSHIP: HIP-HOP AESTHETICS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 24–41 (2009).
177
Anjali Vats, Marking Disidentification: Race, Corporeality, and Resistance in Trademark
Law, 81 S. COMM. J. 237 (2016).
178
Minh-Ha T. Pham, Feeling Appropriately: On Fashion Copyright Talk and Copynorms, 34
SOC. TEXT 51 (2016).
172
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In addition to defining intellectual property in ways which
recognize and attempt to undo its protection of the norms and attendant
authority of whiteness, our mapping identifies several recurring themes:
(1) understanding, situating, and retelling intellectual property’s stories;
(2) grappling with the problems of “traditional knowledge,” “indigenous
knowledge,” and “folklore” under international intellectual property and
human rights regimes; (3) defining and negotiating the scope of the
public domain; (4) framing and reframing concepts of “infringement,”
“counterfeiting,” and “piracy;” (5) considering the role of distributive
justice and Access to Knowledge (A2K); and (6) remaking intellectual
property law to reflect those “faces at the bottom” and with an eye
toward real-world solutions. While we have articulated these as distinct
themes, they often overlap and cross multiple areas of law. Because a
full exploration of the depth and breadth of these themes is beyond the
scope of this piece, we offer only broad overviews in the hopes that
future Race IP Crits will work through each of the themes with greater
detail. The map, one might say, is not a tidy one but one which reflects
the (un)bounded nature of intellectual property law. From these themes,
we can see Critical Race IP as a network of scholarship focused on how
intellectual property scholars take intersectional approaches to
considering the ways people of color are deprived of the rights to create
and access knowledge, often through justifications that render them less
than human, and theoretical and practical approaches to combating such
inequality.
1. Storytelling as Critical Race IP Praxis
Storytelling practices familiar to Race Crits pervaded Race + IP
2017. The authors of this Article began and ended the conference with
stories of Prince as an intellectual property icon, reading him in the
larger context of race, copyright, and musical appropriation.179
Kembrew McLeod spoke about Clyde Stubblefield’s erasure from
James Brown’s “Funky Drummer” and the subsequent sampling of his
unprotected rhythmic work.180 Richard Schur discussed the importance
of storytelling as methodological intervention in relation to Critical
Race IP.181 Margaret Chon crafted a narrative history of race and
intellectual property, through the work of CRT pioneers such as Keith
Aoki and Kimberlé Crenshaw and her own insights about the directions
of the interdisciplinary movement.182 Talks such as these epitomize the
storytelling practices that often characterize CRT scholarship, with their
emphasis on personal experiences, re-contextualizing familiar
179
180
181
182

Vats et al., supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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narratives, centering voices that might otherwise remain unheard, and
writing scholarly histories. More intangibly speaking, they also serve
important affective functions, such as creating feelings of connection,
engagement, and common purpose. Storytelling is alive and well in
Critical Race IP.
As each of the themes that we highlight demonstrates, intellectual
property law, as much as law more generally, is about crafting
narratives which are implicitly or explicitly racialized. Whether through
understandings of intellectual property which marginalize people of
color by emphasizing labor as creativity, 183 narratives of piracy which
characterize those in the developing world as thieves,184 or stories of the
public domain which erase colonial histories,185 copyright, trademark,
patent, right of publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition law are
rife with normative racial discourses of creation. One important
function of Critical Race IP scholarship is to render visible through
counter-storytelling those narratives that animate intellectual property
law’s non-neutrality around race. Engaging the underlying characters,
plots, and values these stories endorse is a vital step in undoing
intellectual property’s whiteness. Moreover, we might also read creative
works and embodied performances as part of the practice of speaking
back to intellectual property law, in the tradition of the legal fiction of
scholars such as Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado.186 For instance, 2
Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman,” Biz Markie’s “Alone Again,” and
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone function as their own types of counterstorytelling, operating as “sites of memory” 187 for alternative
intellectual property truths. As Schur argues in Parodies of Ownership,
African American performance, including hip hop and parody, operates
as both powerful critique and pragmatic remaking of intellectual
property law.188
Counter-stories need not be literary or musical. For instance,

183

SCHUR, supra note 176, at 26.
Lawrence Liang, Piracy, Creativity and Infrastructure: Rethinking Access to Culture
(Working Paper, 2009), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1436229.
185
Foster, supra note 117; Laura A. Foster, Patents, Biopolitics, and Feminisms: Locating Patent
Law Struggles over Breast Cancer Genes and the Hoodia Plant, 19 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP.
371 (2012); see also, Chander & Sunder, supra note 32.
186
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM, CH. 9
THE SPACE TRADERS (1992) [hereinafter FACES]. The short story appeared in two earlier slightly
different versions. See Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a
Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393 (1990); Derrick Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the
Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93 (1989); DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF
SURVIVAL IN AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME, CH. 1 REDEMPTION DEFERRED: BACK TO THE
SPACE TRADERS (1997); see also RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995).
187
King, supra note 175, at 1–22.
188
Schur, supra note 176.
184
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protests against Crazy Horse liquor189 and Marshawn Lynch’s
trademarking of the nickname BeastMode190 might be read as embodied
and performative practices of storytelling, which both assert different
epistemological standpoints than those in dominant culture. Each
standpoint is used to understand knowledge production and critique the
historical exclusion of people of color, particularly black people, from
the privileges of intellectual property ownership. Exploring the role of
storytelling in knowledge production, in forms that both comport with
and break from those traditionally accepted in the academy, is a
productive goal for Critical Race IP, and builds upon a long history in
CRT. Storytelling is a practice that has been and remains important to
Critical Race IP, as a mechanism for locating the voices of marginalized
groups and centering them in legal contexts that otherwise erase them.
2. Protecting Traditional Knowledge
Early conflicts between harmonization of free trade and
intellectual property regimes and the developing world often revolved
around the management of traditional knowledge. Vandana Shiva’s
Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge was an important
post-TRIPS critique of the practices of bioprospecting that allowed
scientists, predominantly in the Western world, to commodify
traditional knowledge.191 Since the publication of Shiva’s work, race
and intellectual property scholars have turned to considering how best
to manage the protection of traditional knowledge, indigenous
knowledge, cultural property, and folklore under the rubrics currently
set out by intellectual property law—or those yet to be constructed. The
treatment of traditional knowledge under TRIPS occupied a
considerable amount of space in intellectual property conversations
through the early 2000s. It remains an important point of conversation
in determining how international intellectual property regimes should
understand and treat non-Western knowledge.192 Pioneers in the area of
protecting traditional knowledge have considered the contours of
protecting TK in the context of different groups; for example,
indigenous Australians,193 Ghanaian kente weavers,194 Indian artisans,195
189

COOMBE, supra note 28.
Vats et al., supra note 3.
191
See SHIVA, supra note 54.
192
Id.
193
See, e.g., Jane Anderson, The Making of Indigenous Knowledge in Intellectual Property Law
in Australia, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 347 (2005); Kathy Bowrey & Jane Anderson, The
Politics of Global Information Sharing: Whose Cultural Agendas Are Being Advanced?, 18 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 479 (2009); Kimberly Christen, Gone Digital: Aboriginal Remix and the
Cultural Commons, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 315 (2005); Kimberly Christen, Opening
Archives: Respectful Repatriation, 74 AM. ARCHIVIST 185 (2011); Jane Anderson, Anxieties of
Authorship in the Colonial Archive, in MEDIA AUTHORSHIP 229 (Cynthia Chris & David A.
Gerstner eds., 2013).
190
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and Bolivian music producers.196 Important parts of the conversation
include how intellectual property ought to refer to traditional
knowledge, how to break down the binary between Western and
traditional knowledge, and how to build digital archives that center the
demands and traditions of the indigenous populations. The question of
how to handle traditional knowledge is complex. It requires local
considerations and nuance which necessitate considerable situated
study. In many ways, the work that has been done is merely the tip of
the iceberg, particularly given the vast disparities in the production of
knowledge in different parts of the world.
These conversations have also notably taken different forms in
different areas of intellectual property. For instance, in the context of
copyrights, the limited ability to protect jazz and hip hop,197 yoga,198
and traditional design199 have come to the fore. The subject matter in
each of those examples is different, though all require a copyright
approach that is flexible enough to account for their particularities. In
the context of trademarks, the issue is often the opposite; that is, the
utilization of racist imagery as alleged source signifiers implicates race
more broadly.200 In the context of patents, battles over biopiracy
continue, in the form of disputes over the ownership of patented
products such as neem oil and turmeric201 and access to
pharmaceuticals.202 Conversations in these areas often revolve around
the best methods for naming, protecting, and remaking traditional
knowledge, particularly when it comes into conflict with maximalist
intellectual property regimes. For example, some scholars argue that
distinguishing between traditional knowledge and “real” knowledge
creates a problematic binary between those who can and cannot create.
194

BOATEMA BOATENG, THAT COPYRIGHT THING DOESN’T WORK HERE: ADINKRA AND KENTE
CLOTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GHANA (2011).
195
See, e.g., Amit Basole, Whose Knowledge Counts? Reinterpreting Gandhi for the Information
Age, 18 INT’L J. HINDU STUD. 369 (2014); Amit Basole, Authenticity, Innovation, and the
Geographical Indication in an Artisanal Industry: The Case of the Banarasi Sari, 18 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 127 (2015).
196
Henry Stobart, Rampant Reproduction and Digital Democracy: Shifting Landscapes of Music
Production and ‘Piracy’ in Bolivia, 19 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY F. 27 (2010).
197
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 157; SCHUR, supra note 176.
198
See, e.g., Allison Elizabeth Fish, Laying Claim to Yoga: Intellectual Property, Cultural Rights,
and the Digital Archive in India (2010) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of California,
Irvine) (available from ProQuest Central); The IPKat: India’s Yoga Database and Patent Piracy,
IPKAT (May 10, 2011), http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2011/05/indioas-yoga-database-and-patentpiracy.html.
199
See BOATENG, supra note 194.
200
See, e.g., Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F. 3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Jasmine Abdel-khalik,
Disparaging Trademarks: Who Matters, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 287 (2015).
201
See, e.g., Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and
the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA J. L. & TECH. 371 (1997).
202
KAUSHIK SUNDER RAJAN, PHARMOCRACY: VALUE, POLITICS, AND KNOWLEDGE IN GLOBAL
BIOMEDICINE (2017).
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It does so by fundamentally placing traditional or “raw” knowledge in a
hierarchy below that which is treated as refined or “cooked”
knowledge.203 Others focus on the best mechanism for protecting
traditional knowledge, include international human rights law. 204 Still
others focus on the remaking of intellectual property law, a legal and
performative process we will turn to at the end of this piece.205 Taken
together, these conflicts point to the inadequacies of conventional
intellectual property law to protect all forms of knowledge, equally and
with an eye toward restorative justice.
3. The Public Domain
Critical Race IP scholarship, like intellectual property scholarship
generally, is concerned with the public domain. However, unlike their
law and economics counterparts, Race IP Crits are concerned with the
racial and social justice dimensions of the management of the public
domain, especially in ways that refuse to recognize property rights in
existing traditional knowledge and hinder access to knowledge. Recent
cases such as Eldred v. Ashcroft206 and Golan v. Holder207 have
extended the term and scope of intellectual property rights, posing
considerable problems for marginalized groups, particularly with
respect to A2K. Unsurprisingly, as per claims of the rise of information
feudalism, such transfers of information often unfold along
(neo)colonial axes, with the developing world paying the price for the
privatization and increasing scope of copyright, patent, and trademark
law.208 Intellectual property maximalism in copyright and patent results
in a “shrinking” public domain by restricting access to knowledge along
distinctly racial lines.209 James Boyle210 and Michael Brown211 offer indepth accounts of this process, while Sunder and Chander highlight the
need to read the public domain as not simply the opposite of intellectual
property but also as a space for (neo)colonial ownership claims to
traditional knowledge.212 “The romance of the public domain” refers to
the fetishistic desire to embrace the public domain as an alternative to

203

See Margaret Chon, Law Professor as Artist: Themes and Variations in Keith Aoki’s
Intellectual Property Scholarship, 90 OR. L. REV. 1251 (2012).
204
See e.g. Rosemary Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275 (2002).
205
See e.g. Kavita Philip, What is a Technological Author? The Pirate Function and Intellectual
Property, 8 POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 199 (2005).
206
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
207
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012).
208
DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59.
209
Id.; SUNDER, supra note 39.
210
Boyle, supra note 137; JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF
THE MIND (2008).
211
MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2004).
212
Chander & Sunder, supra note 32.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050898

KELLER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

772

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

6/4/2018 6:00 PM

[Vol. 36:3

intellectual property maximalism without adequate consideration of its
underlying inequalities.213 Meanwhile, as the expansion of trademark
law threatened and threatens to make the brand all-powerful, both as a
legal and cultural form, it too erodes equal access to the public domain,
particularly for those who were racially stereotyped. Jane Gaines and
Rosemary Coombe trace this process, demonstrating the increasing
value and significance of ownership of the brand as well as resistance to
that ownership, particularly when racial symbols are invoked.214
As information feudalism has grown more intense in the 2000s,
calls for equal access have become more commonplace. Chon, for
instance, argues for wide access to educational materials,215 one which
was borne out in the Delhi University copyright case in which the
Indian Supreme Court determined that the policy interest in access to
knowledge outweighed the monopoly afforded to publishers.216 In
contexts such as access to copyrighted materials or access to
pharmaceuticals, the public domain is not a universal concept but one
that must be situationally redefined to account for the states of
development and growth trajectories of nations in the Global South.217
While we take up some of these examples in the sections that follow,
we observe generally that the public domain is not an unqualified good,
nor is its designation as the opposite of property without complications.
It is instead a social construction which often erases intellectual
property law’s protection of white supremacy and denies A2K to the
world’s most vulnerable populations. The regulation of the public
domain and the scope of its contents, therefore, remain important
questions for scholars of race and intellectual property.
4. Framing and Reframing “Piracy” and “Counterfeiting”
As Adrian Johns demonstrates in his history of “piracy,” the

213

Id.
JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991);
COOMBE, supra note 28. The recent case Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), holding that
SLANTS can be registered as a federal trademark because Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, obviously rests at the intersections of race and
trademark law. The outcome in that case calls for nuanced analysis about the terms that are
available for trademarking, particularly when they have racial implications. See, e.g., Andrew
Chung, Supreme Court ruling leads to offensive trademark requests, REUTERS (July 23, 2017,
10:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-slur/supreme-court-ruling-leads-tooffensive-trademark-requests-idUSKBN1A80L6 (“A small group of companies and individuals
are looking to register racially charged words and symbols for their products, including the Nword and a swastika. . . .”).
215
Chon, supra note 29.
216
Lawrence Liang, The essence of education, HINDU (Dec. 13, 2016, 2:00 AM),
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/The-essence-of-education/article16798107.ece.
217
PRASHANT REDDY T. & SUMATHI CHANDRASHEKARAN, CREATE, COPY, DISRUPT: INDIA’S
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DILEMMAS (2017).
214
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concept is a historically complicated one,218 in which infringers such as
the United States became protectors of intellectual properties once they
had the authority and the incentive to do so. Accordingly, attempts to
label those in the developing world as “pirates” have been met with
considerable conceptual and legal resistance. In particular, those in the
developing world have pushed back against the overarching
development narrative of intellectual property law, asserting the
existence and import of local approaches to the protection of
knowledge.219 Moreover, they have articulated alternative economic
narratives, which reframe and even justify “Third World” infringement
as necessary, beneficial, and unavoidable.220 For instance, Ravi
Sundaram’s concept of the “pirate modernity,” which emerged through
his study of the urban modernities in India, calls for recognition that the
purportedly universal standards advanced by international intellectual
property law do not even begin to describe the material conditions of
existence in rapidly developing nations such as India.221 In Sundaram’s
retelling of the story of the piracy, the urbanization of the city, as well
as its technological development, are integral to understanding the role
of infringement, and indeed its unavoidability, within contemporary
Indian contexts.222 Liang tells a tale of Indian counterfeiters turned
protectors of their intellectual properties, explaining that the progress of
capitalism makes infringement necessary for many to survive. 223 He
identifies capitalism as a core reason for piracy and counterfeiting,
discussing the ways its detritus results in left behind individuals who
copy protected works of authorship and invention to survive.224 Liang’s
work demonstrates the nuance of the developing world’s orientation
toward knowledge production as well as how economic systems
determine knowledge production structures.
Sundaram and Liang offer examples of attempts to reframe those
narratives of so-called piracy that originate in the Global North. They
and others continue to complicate the critique Shiva initiated, refusing
reductive stories of infringement as exclusively about economic loss to

218

JOHNS, supra note 42.
See, e.g., HALBERT, supra note 135; BOATENG, supra note 194.
220
We recognize the limitations of the term “Third World” but nonetheless use it here as a
placeholder for the moral opprobrium the United States attaches to copying in the Global South.
See, e.g., B. R. Tomlinson, What was the Third World? 38 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 307, 307 (2003)
(“[A]lthough the phrase was widely used, it was never clear whether it was a clear category of
analysis, or simply a convenient and rather vague label for an imprecise collection of states in the
second half of the twentieth century and some of the common problems that they faced.”).
221
RAVI SUNDARAM, PIRATE MODERNITY: DELHI’S MEDIA URBANISM (Routledge, 1st ed. 2010).
222
See generally id.
223
Lawrence Liang, Porous Legalities and Avenues of Participation, in SARAI READER 2005:
BARE ACTS 6 (2005).
224
Id. at 13–15.
219
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Western nations. Studies of shanzhai in China,225 hip-hop in South
Africa,226 and pharmaceuticals in Mexico and South and Central
America227 ask us to reconsider accepted notions that piracy always
flows from North to South. Discussions of cultural appropriation,
particularly of traditional designs such as Navajo prints and adrinka and
kente cloth, raise further questions about the nature of piracy.228 Along
these lines, Kavita Philip’s work makes important claims about the
social construction of the pirate figure, particularly by investigating how
it is mobilized in the service of violence in contemporary politics.229
We would be remiss, though, to suggest that framings of piracy—
or any of the other issues that we have identified here—are only
contemporary concerns. Rather, practices of labeling racial Others as
pirates can be traced to colonial notions that people of color were
incapable of producing knowledge of value, a topic we take up further
in Part IV of this article.230 Questions about the definitions and scope of
infringement and counterfeiting are not exceptional ones. Rather, they
are likely to increasingly frame Critical Race IP scholarship,
particularly as developing countries engage arguments for maximalist
intellectual property law in the context of opposing histories, narratives,
and materialities. The characterization and construction of the figure of
the pirate—and infringer more generally—will figure prominently into
these discussions and the pushback against intellectual property
regimes.
5. Access to Knowledge
An overarching question for race and intellectual property scholars
is who receives access to innovations in intellectual property and at
what cost. One early and ongoing battle in this area has revolved around
pharmaceuticals. After the negotiation of TRIPS, which grants
compulsory licenses for certain medications to developing countries,231
India became—and continues to be—the “pharmacy to the developing
world” due to its production of low cost generic drugs in large
225

FAN YANG, FAKED IN CHINA: NATION BRANDING, COUNTERFEIT CULTURE, AND
GLOBALIZATION (2016).
226
ADAM HAUPT, STEALING EMPIRE: P2P, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HIP-HOP SUBVERSION,
CH. 5–6 (2008).
227
Cori Hayden, A Generic Solution? Pharmaceuticals and the Politics of the Similar in Mexico,
48 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 475 (2007); Cori Hayden, The Proper Copy: The insides and
outsides of domains made public, 3 J. CULTURAL ECON. 85 (2010).
228
See, e.g., BOATENG, supra note 194; Minh-Ha T. Pham, What’s in a Name, AM. PROSPECT
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/whats-name-3.
229
Philip, supra note 205; see also LARS ECKSTEIN AND ANJA SCHWARZ, POSTCOLONIAL
PIRACY (2014).
230
Greene, supra note 30.
231
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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quantities.232 The United States and India, however, quickly disagreed
about the latter’s production of cheap drugs. As a result, India has spent
many years on the United States’ Special 301 Priority Watch List and
had a number of disputes with the US over pharmaceuticals, such as
Novartis’ Glivec.233 Other nations, including South Africa and Mexico,
have had similar conflicts with the United States. Much of the
developing world maintains that the limited monopolies granted by
patent law are not suitable for the vast majority of the world because
they limit access to life-saving medications that can be used to treat
HIV/AIDS and cancer.234
While an important component of the A2K conversation,
pharmaceutical access is simply one aspect of a larger problem. Issues
of distributive justice and equal access to intellectual properties arise
repeatedly in international contexts.235 Most recently, the Delhi
University copyright case has been at the center of conversations about
access to scholarship in the developing world. Taking on global fair use
standards, the Indian Supreme Court refused to find copyright
infringement when a copy shop made unlicensed copies of academic
articles and books. India’s move highlights the continuing inability of
those in the developing world to access many forms of knowledge, a
problem that is compounded by the frequent refusal of the developed
world to protect many types of traditional knowledge.236 Keith Aoki,
Margaret Chon, and Ruth Okediji laid the groundwork for discussions
of distributive justice within intellectual property law, centering
questions of protectability of creative works and access to knowledge
on people of color.237 As demonstrated in Sunder’s From Goods to the
Good Life and Foster’s Reinventing Hoodia, these questions remain
live.238 Human flourishing and equal benefit sharing are not yet issues
that intellectual property law is capable of successfully engaging. We
note, as well, that such problems are necessarily intertwined with those
of personhood and property because they implicate the question of who
is read as a full human being worthy of being saved. Moreover,
important questions about how to achieve equal A2K, particularly in a
system of racial capitalism, remain. Because the production and
232

Robinson Esalimba, Novartis Persists In Challenge To Indian Patent Law; India Rejects More
AIDS Drugs Patents, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.ipwatch.org/2009/09/02/novartis-persists-in-challenge-to-indian-patent-law-india-rejects-moreaids-drugs-patents.
233
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2016
SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2016).
234
Halbert, supra note 135.
235
Chon, supra note 29; SUNDER, supra note 39.
236
Univ. of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Servs. (2016) RFA(OS) 81 (Del. HC) (India).
237
Liang, supra note 184.
238
Sunder, supra note 39; LAURA A. FOSTER, REINVENTING HOODIA: PEOPLE, PLANTS, AND
PATENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (2017).
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circulation of intellectual properties often move along raced lines, it will
be impossible to address such questions without considering the
underlying racial structures of copyright, trademark, patent, right of
publicity, trade secret, and unfair competition. Both remaking and
moving beyond law and economics models of IP to engage A2K and
distributive justice concerns are themes that remain and will remain
central in the work of Race IP Crits.
6. Remaking Intellectual Properties
Developing nations have not readily accepted the landscape of
intellectual property law offered to them by developed nations. Quite
the contrary, race and intellectual property scholars have traced attempts
by those in the developing world to contest international intellectual
property regimes, including crafting licenses and exceptions to the
TRIPS policies which apply to the developing world. Some of the
scholarship we have already cited speaks to the desires and practices
around creating new systems of intellectual property law which fully
account for the knowledge created by people of color. 239 Halbert traces
some of these approaches in her book Resisting Intellectual Property.240
Jane Anderson, Kathy Bowrey, Kimberly Christen, and Angela Riley,241
among many others, have done considerable work in examining
indigenous systems of ownership, highlighting possibilities for creating
new licensing schemes, archival practices, and digital information
management practices to extend protections to indigenous knowledge.
Proposals around these ideas are not without their flaws nor are they
completely settled. Rather, they are stepping stones for continuing to
reimagine intellectual properties futures. We turn to the question of how
one might reimagine intellectual property more fully in Part IV, in
which we look at decolonial futures. Notably, while some, such as
Sunder, wish to remake intellectual property through the reorientation
of its values, investments, and goals, for instance by focusing on human
flourishing.242 Others, such as Foster, suggest a need to dig deeper and
unpack the (neo)colonial and capitalist underpinnings of law. 243 While
engagements with remaking in intellectual properties vary in their
pragmatism, all perspectives will be important in intellectual property’s
remaking.
A number of scholars have also undertaken consideration of the
extent to which human rights regimes might be used to re-conceptualize
239

See, e.g., HALBERT, supra note 135.
Id.
241
Anderson, supra note 193; Bowrey & Anderson, supra note 193; Christen, supra note 193;
Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural)
Appropriation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2016).
242
Sunder, supra note 39.
243
FOSTER, supra note 238.
240
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and remake intellectual property law. In particular, the possibilities for
deploying definitions of folklore and cultural property in international
human rights documents has been much discussed as a mechanism for
expanding the scope of intellectual property rights regimes for the
benefit of those in the developing world.244 However, just as with other
solutions and interventions described here, it is unclear whether such
solutions will be workable within current political constraints. The
human rights approach is an example of a practical intervention into
intellectual property law. Such practical interventions — Critical Race
IP in action one might say — are an important aspect of the future of the
interdisciplinary movement. Lateef Mtima conceived of the Intellectual
Property Institute for Social Justice to call attention to issues such as
those we describe here.245 Similarly, K.J. Greene has remained focused
on the practical ways musicians might secure rights to their masters,
including through reparations.246 Nonetheless, any and all spaces for
remaking intellectual property, at individual or structural levels, remain
important for not only making space within existing intellectual
property regimes for the knowledge production of people of color but
also envisioning new institutions, laws, and practices that do not simply
accommodate Other knowledge but embrace it as entitled to protection.
In Part IV, in contemplating decolonization, we engage the question of
what it might mean to remake the fundamental assumptions not only of
intellectual properties but the epistemological understandings of
knowledge that undergird them.
III. ALL WE HAVE IS EACH OTHER: COMMUNITY BUILDING AND PUBLIC
FEELINGS IN CRITICAL RACE IP247
CRT and Critical Race IP are important tools not only for
examining law’s tendencies to maintain white supremacy but also for
engaging with, mobilizing, and shaping public feelings—including
depression, fear, anxiety, love, and especially intimacy248—upon which
244

Coombe, supra note 112.
About Us: History of IIPSJ, INSTITUTE FOR INTELL. PROP. & SOC. JUST.,
http://www.iipsj.org/index.php/home/about-us (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
246
Greene, supra note 30; Greene, supra note 157; K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation
and the Shrinking Doctrine of Consumer Confusion: Trademark Abuse in the Context of
Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609 (2004).
247
Phyllis Chesler, All We Have is Each Other, in THE WOMAN CENTERED ECONOMY: IDEALS,
REALITY, AND THE SPACE IN BETWEEN 105 (Loraine Edwalds & Midge Stocker eds., 1995);
Brandon Tensley, Michael C. Richardson & Rejane Frederick, The 2016 Election Exposed Deep
Seated Racism. Where Do We Go From Here?, MOYERS & COMPANY (Nov. 25, 2016),
http://billmoyers.com/story/2016-election-exposed-deep-seated-racism-go.
248
ANN CVETKOVICH, DEPRESSION: A PUBLIC FEELING 2 (2012) (discussing depression as a
public feeling. She understands “political depression” as negative public feeling through which
political action is mobilized: “This is not, however, to suggest that depression is thereby
converted into a positive experience; it retains its associations with inertia and despair, if not
apathy and indifference, but these feelings, moods, and sensibilities become sites of publicity and
245
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the positive and negative communal connections are built. We are
concerned with how public feelings facilitate community building and
make both CRT and Critical Race IP possible and effective as academic
and activist endeavors. As Crenshaw et al. write:
[I]t would be remiss for us to leave the impression that CRT . . .
developed as a disembodied, abstracted, and autonomous intellectual
formation. . . . [T]his view of scholarship obscures the shared
difficulty that insurgent scholars must negotiate and the importance
of developing collective strategies to write about racial power from
within the institutions central to its reproduction. A thorough
mapping of Critical Race Theory, then, must include a discussion of
the role of community-building among the intellectuals who are
associated with it . . . .249

Community building, as it unfolds in the context of CRT, involves
connection and collectivity, trust and vulnerability. It is a practice which
involves forming bonds with individuals, namely academics and
activists, through the remaking of histories, telling of stories, and
mentoring of young scholars.250 By bringing individuals together around
the goal of anti-racist activism, CRT creates “public intimacy,” 251 in
Berlant’s terms, facilitating the circulation of shared narratives and the
creation of spaces of familiarity, comfort, and safety. Intimacy, as we
use it here, describes a quality of closeness, a shared public feeling
which binds Race Crits together in a group, a community around the
goal of anti-racist activism, particularly in legal spaces. In this section,
we focus on both community building and public feelings of intimacy to
stress the emotional components of CRT. Put differently, while all
intimacy evokes a sense of community and closeness, even if with only
one other person, not all communities are bound together by intimacy.
CRT and Critical Race IP function best when they involve both strong
public feelings of intimacy and practices of community building. We
therefore attend to CRT and Critical Race IP as involving both formal
practices of community building and emotional practices of intimacy
making. Without intimacy, as Crenshaw et al. suggest, anti-racist
activism fails, because “insurgent scholars” lack the base from which to
speak truth to power. In spaces of connection, both CRT and Critical
Race IP thrive and flourish.
community formation. One of the larger goals for Public Feelings is to generate the affective
foundation of hope that is necessary for political action.”). We read intimacy in the same vein, as
a public feeling of closeness that can be cultivated in community contexts. On the usefulness of
emotion in critical race theory, see generally Janine Young Kim, Racial Emotions and the Feeling
of Equality, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 437 (2016).
249
Crenshaw et al., supra note 17, at xxvii.
250
See generally Angela P. Harris, Building Theory, Building Community, 8 SOC. & LEG. STUD.
313 (1999).
251
Berlant, supra note 5.
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Before turning to the ways CRT and Critical Race IP involve both
community building and intimacy, we find it useful to contextualize the
term intimacy, by way of work on public feelings, emotions, and affect.
In the section entitled “Structures of Feeling” in his 1977 book Marxism
and Literature, Raymond Williams writes:
Such changes can be defined as changes in structures of feeling. . . .
‘[F]eeling’ is chosen to emphasize a distinction from more formal
concepts of ‘world-view’ or ‘ideology.’ It is not only that we must go
beyond formally held and systematic beliefs . . . . It is that we are
concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and
felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs
are in practice variable . . . over a range from formal assent with
private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between selected and
interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences.252

In recent years, an affective turn in the academy has encouraged
the study not only of, in Williams’ parlance, structures of feeling and
emotion, but also affect itself.253 The affective turn, of course, is not
new.254 It is the resurrection and reanimation of the work of scholars of
color, often black feminists and queer scholars, including Audre Lorde
and bell hooks, who have explicitly and implicitly focused on emotional
networks as fundamental to the survival of marginalized
communities.255 Affect is largely a neurobiological term used to
describe precognitive intensities, one which some use to trace social and
cultural practices.256 In contrast, the term public feelings, which we use
interchangeably with emotions, describes those named affective
experiences which are named and circulated in public discourse and
shared across bodies.257 These definitions, however, are best read as
“points of departure for discussion rather than definition,”258 starting
points for thinking about how community building practices work in
tandem with public feelings in the contexts of CRT, including its
252

RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 132 (1977).
CVETKOVICH, supra note 248, at 4 (footnote omitted) (“In a narrower sense, the affective turn
has been signifying a body of scholarship inspired by Deleuzian theories of affect as force,
intensity, or the capacity to move and be moved.”).
254
CVETKOVICH, supra note 248, at 7–8.
255
Audre Lorde, The Uses of Anger, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 278 (1997); Jennifer C. Nash,
Practicing Love: Black Feminism, Love-Politics, and Post-Intersectionality, 11 MERIDIANS:
FEMINISM, RACE, TRANSNATIONALISM 1 (2013). In this vein, Critical Race IP is also a space for
thinking more broadly towards radical intersectionality, vis-à-vis sexuality, gender, class,
disability, and other categories of oppression. See also Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind
Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y. 811 (2013).
256
BRIAN MASSUMI, PARABLES FOR THE VIRTUAL: MOVEMENT, AFFECT, SENSATION 30 (2002).
257
CVETKOVICH, supra note 248, at 4 (footnote omitted) (“Crucial to such inquiry is the
distinction between affect and emotion, where the former signals precognitive sensory experience
and relations to surroundings, and the latter cultural constructs and conscious processes that
emerge from them, such as anger, fear, or joy.”).
258
Id. at 5.
253
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interdisciplinary offshoots, and Critical Race IP. Sara Ahmed explains
the central inquiry of public feelings:
How do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and
against other others? How do emotions move between bodies? . . .
[E]motions play a crucial role in the ‘surfacing’ of individual and
collective bodies through the way in which emotions circulate
between bodies and signs. Such an argument clearly challenges any
assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply
belong to individuals, or even that they come from within and then
move outward toward others.259

Ahmed thinks about public feelings as transmitted between
individuals, in ways which can be theorized and interpreted. In her
formulation, representational practices are not simply logically
instructive but also emotionally so. The passion of public feeling creates
bonds between individuals and ultimately collective identities, even
though such feelings do not reside within individuals per se. Ahmed
continues, “[i]n such affective economies, emotions do things, and they
align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social
space—through the very intensity of their attachments.”260 Per Williams
and Ahmed, it is possible to trace and theorize the movement of public
feelings across social spaces and between individuals. One such space
in which public feelings move is in and through legal structures and
among those negotiating them in their everyday lives.
The affective turn has manifested in legal scholarship as well as
the academy at large.261 As scholars have turned to studying the role of
emotion in contexts such as remorse in sentencing,262 vigilante
justice,263 and the death penalty,264 the connections between law and
structures of feeling have become increasingly clear. Studies of feeling
predate the affective turn and were perhaps the inevitable outcome of
intersectional feminist urgings to make the personal political.265 Indeed,
in many ways, the central struggle of racial justice in the United States,
from Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to Black Lives Matter, could be
articulated as one centered on moving public feelings, through interest
259

Sara Ahmed, Affective Economies, 22 SOC. TEXT 117, 117 (2004).
Id. at 119.
261
See generally Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging
Field, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006) (including a lengthy literature review of existing
scholarship at the intersections of law and emotion).
262
See, e.g., Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (2002).
263
See, e.g., Tyler Scully & Kenneth Moorman, The Rise of Vigilantism in 1980 Comics: Reasons
and Outcomes, 47 J. POPULAR CULTURE 634 (2014).
264
See generally Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355 (2008).
265
Id.
260
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convergence or moral suasion.266 In the tradition of scholarship engaged
with public feelings, this section reads CRT and Critical Race IP as
fundamentally intimate anti-racist projects, which thrive through the
constitution of community, connection, and mutual investment.
Understanding CRT and Critical Race IP as engaged in the work of
public feelings— including racial feelings—is helpful in considering
how both have evolved and continue to evolve. It also provides insight
into structural and material necessities for developing Critical Race IP.
A. CRT as intimate practice
As Berlant describes, intimacy is a worldmaking enterprise, one
through which individuals build space for connection through shared
stories, feelings, and vulnerabilities.267 Moreover, intimacy need not be
only between persons in romantic, friendly, or familial relationships, it
is a feeling which can be negotiated in a variety of contexts, including
jurisprudential ones.268 Indeed, Berlant goes on to explain that, for
Jurgen Habermas, intimacy is a vital part of democratic engagement,
specifically “the notion of the democratic public sphere thus made
collective intimacy a public and social ideal, one of fundamental
political interest.”269 The notion of collective intimacy is a helpful one
for thinking about radical practices within legal spaces, particularly
CRT. For instance, in “The Word and the River: Pedagogy as
Scholarship as Struggle,” Charles R. Lawrence III writes:
I feel an immediate kinship with the tradition that [Vincent] Harding
describes and names ‘the Word.’ It is a tradition of teaching,
preaching, and healing; an interdisciplinary tradition wherein healers
are concerned with the soul and preachers with the pedagogy of the
oppressed; a tradition that eschews hierarchy in the face of the need
for all of us who seek liberation to be both teachers and students.270

The Word, Lawrence reminds us, is “a unifying force, a statement
of protest, an expression of courage, an organizing tool, the articulation
of utopian dreams or a higher law . . . .”271 It also requires space for
feeling and experience, in a manner that calls upon African traditions as
models for passing on information to future generations through modes
such as storytelling and oral historical tradition.272
266

See generally Jeffrey J. Pyle, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s
Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REV. 787 (1999).
267
Berlant, supra note 5.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 283.
270
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and The River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2238 (1992)(footnote omitted).
271
Id. at 2249.
272
Id. at 2278–79.
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Lawrence’s framing of the Word is thematically similar to the way
that other Race Crits talk about CRT as practice of storytelling,273
finding voice,274 and undoing the perception of racial non-neutrality in
the law.275 Each of these practices is deeply interconnected with the
circulation of public feelings about law, legal pedagogy, race, and social
justice. Even reading foundational CRT texts suggests the community
building and intimacy making that was interwoven into the history of
the movement. From stories of the original CRT workshops to the
familiarity with which scholars in the area refer to one another, making
visible the non-racial neutrality of law has always been the practice of
cultivating public feelings between comrades, establishing relationships
between Race Crits, and making space for radical legal practice.
Berlant’s language is useful in reading Lawrence’s: he describes a
process creating shared (counter)stories, ones which center marginalized
experiences. In his piece, teaching and learning operate as practices of
building community and intimacy between individuals who might
otherwise not find a place in the legal academy. CRT is, therefore, as
much about building a space for connection between individuals, i.e.,
doing the world-making work of racial justice, as it is about unseating
dominant ideologies in law about race. Indeed, the latter process, which
involves understanding CRT as a praxis of radical racial justice in the
world, necessarily meant activist-scholars working together on legal
matters.276 Naming the processes of community building through
intimacy making is a productive exercise, one that makes visible some
of the practices through which CRT not only critiqued the law’s
insistence on its purported racial neutrality but also effectively
constructed networks, relationships, and spaces in which people of color
could thrive in and through law, in the face of white supremacy.
Perhaps no methodological commitment of CRT illustrates better
the process of community building and intimacy making than
storytelling. Deeply tied to CRT’s investments in anti-racist activism
and centering marginalized voices, storytelling operated as a vehicle for
making space for equality. In Faces at the Bottom of the Well and The
Rodrigo Chronicles, two landmark CRT texts, Derrick Bell and Richard
Delgado adopt a storytelling style, using fiction and narrative to weave
parables about race and law.277 Their generic choices themselves –
specifically moves to create protagonists who move through legal
institutions and tell stories about the law using a set of epistemological

273

See Mutua, supra note 17, at 356 (2006); see also FACES, supra note 186.
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 270.
See, e.g., Crenshaw et al., supra note 17.
276
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1259–60 (2011).
277
See FACES, supra note 186; see also DELGADO, supra note 186.
274
275
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assumptions that are not defaults of the legal system – are in a form that
is as much about the intimacies of law as it is about law’s technicalities.
“The Space Traders,” one of the most memorable chapters of Faces at
the Bottom of the Well, tells an evocative science fiction tale which
traces the negotiations that might unfold in a world in which aliens
promised to fix all of America’s problems in exchange for the nation’s
black population.278 While initially the tale might provoke incredulous
reactions, it quickly becomes hauntingly real, an accessible and realistic
portrayal of the United States’ continual failure to secure racial justice
for black people. Stories such as this follow an introduction which
reminds us that race and law in America are fundamentally emotional
and personal experiences, ones which are prominent in public feelings.
Bell writes: “When I was growing up in the years before the Second
World War, our slave heritage was more a symbol of shame than a
source of pride. It burdened black people with an indelible mark of
difference as we struggled to be like whites.”279 Bell speaks not only of
the public feelings around the laws which institutionalized racism but
also the collective experience of blackness in America, the inherent
connectedness of those emotions and their relationship to community
and growing up with slaves as ancestors. By articulating the public
feelings associated with his experience, Bell forces us to feel law, not
simply think it.
The Rodrigo Chronicles similarly explores emotions, by narrating
a series of dialogic conversations between “Professor” and Rodrigo, a
person of color in law school. After the book’s publication, Delgado
wrote “Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle,” subtitled, = “Empathy and False
Empathy,” which he begins: “I was sitting in my darkened office one
afternoon, thinking about my life. To tell the truth, I was missing
Rodrigo. Not long ago, I had consigned him to the Great Beyond. But
now I was flooded with regret and sadness. I missed his brashness, his
insouciant originality. Odd, I had not thought of myself as
sentimental.”280 Delgado speaks of the emotions of the fictional law
professor, emphasizing the bond between him and his former student.
The passage is notable not only because of its description of the
emotional bond between Rodrigo and his former professor but because
278

FACES, supra note 186, at 159 (“And this point constituted the third surprise. Those mammoth
vessels carried within their holds treasure of which the United States was in most desperate need:
gold, to bail out the almost bankrupt federal, state, and local governments; special chemicals
capable of unpolluting the environment, which was becoming daily more toxic, and restoring it to
the pristine state it had been before Western explorers set foot on it; and a totally safe nuclear
engine and fuel, to relieve the nation’s all-but-depleted supply of fossil fuel. In return, the visitors
wanted only one thing—and that was to take back to their home star all the African Americans
who lived in the United States.”).
279
Id. at 1.
280
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 61, 61 (1996)(footnotes omitted).
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Delgado focuses on them in a law review article. He speaks of the
community building and intimacy making that happens in law schools,
particularly around questions of race and identity. The Rodrigo
Chronicles highlights through storytelling the process through which
mentor and student develop intimacy and come together in common
purpose, in a manner that is connected and transformative.
Storytelling, of course, is not significant because it is a new
practice but because of the way it brings to light structural inequalities
and identity based discrimination that is otherwise erased from view.
Moreover, storytelling, through its resonance with individual
experience, is an effective means of mobilizing action in the service of
racial justice. Crenshaw’s groundbreaking “Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color,” makes explicit the role of community building and intimacy in
the struggle to end violence against women of color. She writes,
presaging Berlant, “[t]his process of recognizing as social and systemic
what was formerly perceived as isolated and individual has also
characterized the identity politics of African Americans, other people of
color, and gays and lesbians, among others. For all these groups,
identity-based politics has been a source of strength, community, and
intellectual development.”281 CRT, as mechanism for navigating the
relationship between law and race, is rooted in the need to make public
those experiences which often unfold in private and highlight the racism
which is rendered institutionally invisible. Therefore, to think CRT is,
necessarily, to think community building and intimacy and to move
individuals to intervene in oppressive systems. It is to think about
strategies for activism in a fundamentally anti-black and anti-people of
color justice system, it is to think about surviving together in the face of
oppression, it is to think about creating spaces for coping with
inequality, and it is to think about the connection required to sustainably
resist violence against people of color. With CRT’s approach to
community building and intimacy as a model, we turn to a discussion of
community building and intimacy in intellectual property law and
intellectual properties generally, as well as the relevance of both in
forming a cohesive area of study around Critical Race IP.
B. Critical Race IP as community building and intimacy making
In the quote at the beginning of this Article, Claudia Rankine and
Beth Loffreda remind us that creative works are always already about
race.282 We are, as individuals, inescapably chained to “race and its
infiltrations” in ways which manifest in the creation, reception, and
281
282

Crenshaw, supra note 18, at 1241–42.
Rankine & Loffreda, supra note 4.
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circulation of creative works. How individuals make, interpret, and
share creative works is fundamentally affected by their identities, in
ways which are not always apparent or even conscious. The problem of
“race and its infiltrations,” as we discussed earlier, is not one which is
confined to copyright law. Rather, trademark law and patent law are
also fundamentally raced enterprises. Moreover, intellectual
properties—including, for instance, books like The Wind Done Gone,
bands like the Slants, and the protection of turmeric for wound
healing—are part of the fabric of everyday life, they are objects through
which public feelings about race are created, transmitted, and
negotiated. In other words, intellectual properties are deeply linked not
only to identity but also to public feelings about identity. Intellectual
property works, as Minh-Ha Pham puts it in the context of copyright,
“not as a system that simply controls and regulates the circulation of
creative works but more fundamentally as a system that provides
institutional infrastructure for privileging some emotional expressions
and occluding others.”283 Through intellectual properties, “[b]odies can
catch feelings as easily as catch fire: affect leaps from one body to
another.”284
Communities also come together to respond to intellectual
properties which mobilize public feelings. Returning to the examples
above, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin285 moved African American
literary scholars to respond to attempts to erase Alice Randall’s tale of
Scarlett O’Hara’s half black sister.286 Matal v. Tam prompted Asian
American and Native American activists to question the choice to
trademark a name that for many still operates as a racial slur. 287 The
grant of patent protection of turmeric for wound healing sparked
outrage among Indian and Indian American communities, resulting a
political movement against biopiracy. Such responses demonstrate the
potential for intellectual properties to prompt the spontaneous and short
lived or long lasting formation of communities that counter their
provocations of public feelings. We further argue that, as in the case of
CRT, communities of those who are interested in racial justice in the
context of intellectual properties have the potential to form long lasting
connections, with shared intimacy, around Critical Race IP.

283

Pham, supra note 178, at 68.
Anna Gibbs, Contagious Feelings: Pauline Hanson and the Epidemiology of Affect, 25
AUSTRAL. HUMAN. REV. (2002), http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/IssueDecember-2001/gibbs.html.
285
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
286
Declaration of Henry Louis Gates, Jr., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp.
2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), No. 01-00701-CV-CAP-1; Declaration of Toni Morrison, SunTrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), No. 1:01 CV-701-CAP
(N.D. Ga. 2001).
287
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
284
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Race + IP 2017 was an opportunity for scholars with an interest in
race and intellectual property to join together in conversations about the
topic. The conference, which over 60 individuals attended, brought
together an eclectic mix of individuals from across disciplines,
including law, communication, Ethnic Studies, anthropology, and Black
Studies. During the event, scholars and activists commented on the
public feelings the conference elicited, from excitement about the
speakers in attendance to anticipation for that which might come next.
Talks about particular icons of intellectual property—Prince, Clyde
Stubblefield, the Cadillac—evoked sentiments of pride, sadness,
nostalgia, and anger. The end of the conference, punctuated by a talk by
Simon Tam and as well as an impromptu dance party to the music of the
Slants, brought scholars together in a thoughtful and festive manner
which, while unconventional for most academic events was perhaps
appropriate for a race and intellectual property conference. The point we
are trying to make here is that the project of Critical Race IP is one
which is organically disposed to both community building and intimacy
making. Gathering to speak about topics around race, intellectual
properties, and social justice naturally lends itself to affective
connectedness and public feelings of excitement, frustration, anger,
hope, and intimacy which move among bodies. Moreover, recognizing
such public feelings and the relationship to the creation of communities
around race and activism is in keeping with the tradition of CRT.
The tendency of Critical Race IP to elicit and traffic in public
feelings which aid in the creation of community and intimacy is helpful
in contemplating the contours of the material structures which might
facilitate the growth of the area of study. Events which both recognize
and center the affective qualities of intellectual properties in a manner
that facilitates community building around racial justice are productive
ones for building Critical Race IP. In the context of CRT, community
building and intimacy making unfolded at workshops, LatCrit
conferences, and through an informal network of scholars committed to
mentoring those who wished to join the legal academy. We propose that
the future of Critical Race IP involves similar material interventions,
which create space for continued discussion of the intersections between
race and intellectual properties. Moreover, because Critical Race IP is
so intertwined with CRT, considering some of the central questions that
Race Crits have grappled with may be helpful in articulating the
boundaries and materialities of the incipient field.
For instance, like LatCrit, Critical Race IP would benefit from
embracing the “shifting bottoms” and “rotating centers” models upon
which Athena Mutua elaborates.288 Mutua asked with respect to the
288
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black/white binary in CRT: “What group should be at the center of a
given study or enterprise?” “Whose faces are at the bottom of the well?”
and “What model should we use to analyze a given paradigm?”289
Though these questions do not precisely port over to our discussion of
Critical Race IP, Mutua’s answer to them, which argues for the need to
center multiple groups from “the bottom,” resonates with Critical Race
IP’s diverse, transnational themes and investments. She writes, “The
key to the ‘bottom’ metaphor is that the ‘bottom’ is constructed by the
particularities of ‘white power’s’ . . . obsessions, which result in the
creation of different racial categories and systems.” 290 Race IP Crits
might consider how whiteness orients the field of intellectual property
and where future research might best unfold. Moreover, as Mutua
contends, coalition building is a worthy goal for Race IP Crits.
Considering how to reconcile the diverse histories of the “shifting
bottoms” as a means for creating “rotating centers” may be helpful in
articulating how to conceptualize future events and scholarly works.
While we have proposed provisional themes here, we only offer an
opening salvo, one, which we hope that Race IP Crits will take up in
productive ways. The questions of who might be at the center of Critical
Race IP, if the area of study indeed has a center, whose faces are at the
bottom of the intellectual property well, and what models should be
used to analyze given paradigms are certainly open ones. For the time
being, cultivating the ideals of community building and intimacy within
the context of Critical Race IP may be a sufficient starting point for
answering those questions as well as new and developing ones.
IV. CRITICAL RACE IP AS DECOLONIZING PRAXIS
In the historic piece “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,” Derrick Bell, Jr.
observes that “Leroy Clark has written that the black community’s
belief in the efficacy of litigation inhibited the development of
techniques involving popular participation and control, that might have
advanced school desegregation in the South.”291 Bell, who echoes the
criticism of Civil Rights Movement leaders such as Dr. King, goes on to
observe that “[t]he problem of unjust laws . . . is almost invariably a
problem of distribution of political and economic power.”292 If we
accept Bell’s principle as true, then it is necessary to find productive

Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999); see also Matsuda, supra note 106; cf.
FACES, supra note 186.
289
See Mutua, supra note 288, at 1177–78.
290
Id. at 1180.
291
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 514 (1976).
292
Id.
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extra-legal as well as legal approaches to anti-racist and anti-colonial
resistance within the context of intellectual properties, ones which are
not invested in conservative law and economics models. Following
Bell’s lead and his conceptualization of racial realism,293 we offer as
one avenue for locating such radical approaches: decolonial theory.
Addressing the structural sources of the unequal distribution of political
and economic power that Bell raises as a primary cause of racial nonneutrality in law is a central goal of decolonial theory and practice,
which have become increasingly central to anti-racist and anti-colonial
strategy among academics and activists. While we do not mean to
suggest that decolonial theory is the one right answer to reworking race
and intellectual property, we maintain that its understanding of the
nexus of (neo)coloniality, narratives of progress, power, and knowledge
is a useful one to deploy to undo intellectual property’s racial and
(neo)colonial logics. Moreover, decolonial theory can be thought
together with other types of critical theory, including CRT, feminism,
and queer theory in order to imagine new ways of creating radical
multiversalities. As such, it creates space for a complex and
multifaceted engagement with race, (neo)coloniality and intellectual
property that addresses the fundamental historical power dynamics that
shaped laws of knowledge production. In short, it is only through the
death of the (European/American) human294 that Others can claim their
place as radical equal partners in humanity.295
Decoloniality, as Walter Mignolo describes it, addresses the
“hidden agenda” of modernity, 296 namely an investment in coloniality.
For him, coloniality “names the underlying logic of the foundation and
unfolding of Western civilization from the Renaissance to today of
which historical colonialisms have been a constitutive, though
downplayed, dimension.”297 Darrel Wanzer-Serrano describes
decoloniality’s centrality in creating systems of power which embrace
Otherness, writing “[d]ecoloniality is an alternative accent – one
marked by pluriversal commitments, geohistorical attentiveness, and
biographical configurations.”298 As such, the “coloniality” in
decoloniality does not simply describe the process and reparation of
293

For an overview of Bell’s conception of racial realism, see generally Derrick Bell, Racial
Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
294
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, The topology of being and the geopolitics of knowledge:
Modernity, empire, coloniality, 8 CITY 29 (2004).
295
Alexander Weheyliye’s recent book, Habeas Viscus, is also a notable intervention in this
conversation, one which is consonant with the aims of decolonial theory. ALEXANDER
WEHEYLIYE, HABEAS VISCUS (2014).
296
WALTER D. MIGNOLO, THE DARKER SIDE OF WESTERN MODERNITY: GLOBAL FUTURES,
DECOLONIAL OPTIONS 2 (2011).
297
Id.
298
DARREL WANZER-SERRANO, THE NEW YORK YOUNG LORDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
LIBERATION 22 (2015).
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colonization, it describes the logics of progress, enlightenment,
development, and democracy which made the domination of Other
peoples, in its many racist and (neo)colonial manifestations, a thinkable
option. Modernity and coloniality are, therefore, fundamentally
intertwined, with the former often offering ideological and narrative
justifications for the latter. Per Anibal Quijano, (neo)coloniality
operates through a “matrix of power”299 with four component parts:
economic control, authority, patriarchal domination, and knowledge and
subjectivity.300 Quijano explains the scope of coloniality, as well as its
tendency to permeate other forms of oppression:
In the beginning colonialism was a product of a systematic
repression, not only of the specific beliefs, ideas, images, symbols or
knowledge that were not useful to global colonial domination, while
at the same time the colonizers were expropriating from the
colonized their knowledge . . . as well as their products and work.
The repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of
producing knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and
systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over the
resources, patterns, and instruments of formalized and objectivised
[sic] expression, intellectual or visual. It was followed by the
imposition of the use of the rulers’ own patterns of expression, and
of their beliefs and images with reference to the supernatural. These
beliefs and images served not only to impede the cultural production
of the dominated, but also as a very efficient means of social and
cultural control, when the immediate repression ceased to be constant
and systematic.301

For Quijano, the colonization of power was the underlying impetus
for the creation of the category of race, the original move which made
all other forms of domination possible.302 Moreover, colonization’s
objectification of the colonized, i.e. rendering them the objects of study
instead of producers of knowledge, conceptually voids the idea of Other
knowledge.303 The four categories of the colonial matrix that Quijano
identifies articulate areas in which colonizers exercised their power to
effect total control over the colonized and their knowledge.
Decolonization, therefore, requires a “de-linking” from the
colonial matrix of power and its ideological commitments to modernity,

299

Id. (While the concept of the coloniality of power originates with Quijano as cited below,
Mignolo, as used by Wanzer-Serrano, adopts the term “matrix of power.”).
300
See generally Anibal Quijano, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America, 1
NEPANTLA 533 (2000); see also Walter Mignolo, Introduction: Coloniality of power and decolonial thinking, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 155 (2007).
301
Anibal Quijano, Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 168, 169 (2007).
302
See generally Quijano, supra note 300.
303
Id.
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with all its component parts.304 Put differently, decolonial theory and
praxis conceives of “epistemological reconstitution,”305 which makes
space for “another rationality which may legitimately pretend to some
universality.”306 Wanzer-Serrano defines decoloniality as:
[A]ny practice, discursive or otherwise, that facilitates a divestment
from modernity/coloniality and invents openings through which
decolonial epistemics can emerge. . . . Delinking requires changes in
both content and form . . . . It requires being oriented toward shifts in
our genealogies of thought, including drawing authority from
colonized spaces/voices and resisting latent imperialisms—even
when such resistance may not be exclusively oppositional.307

Decoloniality is also distinct from dewesternization, a practice
which attempts to create radical multiversality through the already
existing frameworks of global governance and neoliberal capitalism.308
We are skeptical that dewesternization, as Mignolo defines it, can play
any role in undoing intellectual property’s valorization of economic
productivity, investment, and profit, or its deep and entrenched fidelity
to racial capitalism. The post-Lochner and post-Fordist world imagines
creatorship as labor performed in the service of national economic
survival. Consequently, we imagine the decolonial as the radical
departure from law and economics and racial capitalism as well as
racism and (neo)colonialism. That is not to say that incrementalism is
unimportant in moving toward a decolonized world; rather that the
struggle for social justice in intellectual property law appears to
necessitate undoing and remaking economic models that fuel racial
capitalism.
In this section, then, we situate decoloniality as a practice which
can be used to unmake intellectual property’s investments in whiteness
and racial capitalism, particularly because of its overarching
engagement with the underlying epistemologies of knowledge
production and its transnational scope. We first define coloniality, a
practice which is both historical and contemporary, with reference to
decolonial understandings of the term and then examine how
decoloniality might be used to think through intellectual property’s
“possessive investment in whiteness.”309 In doing so, we offer
304

MIGNOLO, supra note 296, at 159–60.
Quijano, supra note 301, at 176.
306
Id. at 177.
307
Wanzer-Serrano, supra note 298, at 25.
308
Christopher Mattison, Delinking, Decoloniality & Dewesternization: Interview with Walter
Mignolo
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II),
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(May
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2012),
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/05/02/delinking-decoloniality-dewesternization-interviewwith-walter-mignolo-part-ii.
309
See generally GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INTEREST IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE
PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (2006).
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decoloniality as an avenue for theoretical and practical exploration visà-vis intellectual properties. As we show, spaces of knowledge
production that break with the demands of coloniality already exist, and
we model what may come next.310
Coloniality, as formulated by Mignolo and Quijano, implicitly
includes intellectual property regimes, which incorporate core principles
of modernity into their frameworks for governing property ownership.
Whether understood through the history of devaluing the knowledge of
racial Others, including slaves and indigenous peoples, the imposition
of predominantly European intellectual property rights regimes on the
developing world, the commodification of traditional knowledge, or the
implicit imposition of development agendas on the regulation of
knowledge production, intellectual property law reinforces the central
premises of modernity and beliefs in the inequality of people of color
that underlie them. Because intellectual property law is deeply
embedded within and committed to reproducing modernity/coloniality,
legal reform without undoing its fundamentally European values is
unlikely to succeed in creating more racially just information
paradigms.311 Put differently, decolonizing intellectual property is a
necessary prerequisite to undoing the racial hierarchies that are
embedded within the law itself. While this does not mean that we
should abandon attempts at legal reform, it does mean grappling with
the underlying power dynamics through which intellectual property
regimes were and continue to be produced. Read as such,
decolonization is a complementary project to CRT, one that looks
beyond even the ideologies which inform law’s racial non-neutrality.
Decolonial thinking might therefore be read as overlapping with CRT
but with a broad commitment to undoing the damage of
modernity/coloniality on the world, including its structures for
information economies.
Nelson Maldonado-Torres uses the framework of decoloniality to
construct a framework for not simply anti-(neo)colonial resistance but
310

See, e.g., Dalida Maria Benfield, Apparatuses, Globalities, Assemblages: Third Cinema, Now
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with
University of California, Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations); Vats, supra note 126.
311
This premise is complicated by practices of dewesternization, which attempt to remake
intellectual property’s fundamental Europeanness. See, e.g., MIGNOLO, supra note 296, at 48
(defining dewesternization as “economic autonomy of decision and negotiation in the
international arena and affirmation of the sphere of knowledge, subjectivity. It means, above all,
deracialization: it is the moment in which . . . the ‘other’ has become ‘the same’ but with a
difference: the wounds inflicted over time by the imperial difference.”); Walter Mignolo,
Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom, 26 THEORY, CULTURE
& SOC’Y. 1 (2009); see also Vats, supra note 126 (citing Mignolo’s definition of
dewesternization). While dewesternization may create space for Otherness within the colonial
matrix, it remains problematic because of its investments in capitalism—albeit of a less racially
inflected type than the status quo—and neoliberalism. As such, dewesternization that does not
attend to larger global systems provides its own set of problems.
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also anti-racist thinking. Following W.E.B. DuBois and Sylvia Wynter,
he argues for the centrality of modernity/coloniality in the construction
of racist regimes. For him, as with Fanon, “[d]ecolonization is about the
creation of a new symbolic and material order that takes the full
spectrum of human history, its achievements, and its failures, into
view.”312 Yet the path of decolonization is not shaped around
“overcoming” Empire or (neo)colonization as Fanon intimates. 313 It is
constructed through radical departure from the logics of modernity.
Maldonado-Torres continues:
Taking Du Bois and Wynter’s lead, I would like to suggest that from
the perspectives of the repeatedly racialized groups of modernity,
particularly indigenous people and people of African or Afro-mixed
ex-slave descent, but also Jews and Muslims, a concept of Being
premised on what is often referred to as the dialectics of modernity
and the nation, and their supposed overcoming by the emergence of
imperial sovereignty or Empire, miss the non-dialectical character of
damnation. That is, in short, that what are changes for many, for
those whom Frantz Fanon called the condemned of the earth seem
rather to be perverse re-enactments of a logic that has for a long time
militated against them.314

Here, the decolonial is about creating something beyond the dialectic of
modernity and coloniality, a framework that can radically embrace and
center Otherness. His work is instructive here, as it offers us space for
conceiving of how the decolonial accesses the problems of racism and
(neo)coloniality in structures of knowledge production. In the remainder
of the section, we unpack how delinking might look, as a set of
scholarly and activist perspectives, guided by an ethic of decolonial
love, that reorients us toward hearing the voices of the Global South so
that we might begin disrupting what we know and how we come to
know those things, but not necessarily in ways that are accountable or
attempt to answer to the West.315
Anderson, who spoke on this at Race + IP 2017, dreams of “decolonial futures” in the context of intellectual property law. 316 While she
predominantly focuses on indigenous knowledge, her work asks us to
consider how and why decolonial theory might inform attempts to
reimagine intellectual property law. For Anderson, decolonizing
indigenous knowledge, at least in part, includes the creation of a new
312

Nelson Maldonado-Torres, The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge:
Modernity, Empire, Coloniality, 8 CITY 29, 36 (2004).
313
See generally FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1963).
314
Maldonado-Torres, supra note 312 at 42 (emphasis omitted).
315
Wanzer-Serrano, supra note 298, at 27.
316
See Reimagining IP, Race + IP, http://raceipconference.org/sessions/reimagining-ip (lasted
visited Mar. 30, 2018); see generally JANE ANDERSON, www.jane-anderson.info (last visited
Aug. 15, 2017).
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system of labels and licenses whereby indigenous peoples have control
over how information and objects are managed.317 One functional
outcome of such licensing projects—as well as the attendant pushes to
leverage human rights as a means of protecting traditional
knowledge318—is to revalue knowledge that has been consistently
marginalized, in part by highlighting the right of its creators to dictate
how and when it is used. Scholars such as Boateng and Basole also
examine ways of addressing the devaluation of traditional knowledge.
Both scholars suggest even the terms “traditional knowledge” and
“indigenous knowledge” are problematic because they create categories
of information within intellectual property regimes.319 Identifying
traditional knowledge or indigenous knowledge frequently involves
differentiating it from information produced in Western contexts in
ways which are legible to international intellectually property regimes.
However, as Okediji and Coombe point out, such intellectual property
regimes were built on a foundation of coloniality which refused to
categorize information produced by the colonized as knowledge.320
These critiques operate as delinking moves, which question the
narratives that modernity has laid out for non-European knowledge.
They also exemplify the type of critical practice that might aid in
reimagining intellectual property law,.
Delinking decoloniality in the context of intellectual property
requires the rejection of narratives which categorize Other knowledge as
secondary or inferior to that of Westerners, whether implicitly or
explicitly. Terms such as “traditional knowledge,” “indigenous
knowledge,” and “folklore” are dangerous precisely because they create
a bifurcation between that knowledge produced informally, often by
non-Westerners, and “real” knowledge. Resisting such narratives, for
instance by advancing narratives of bio-piratical theft from the nonWestern world and reclaiming memories that might otherwise be erased
from the canon, are important first steps in remaking the laws of
information. The step, which follows pulling back the curtain on the
implications of the modernity/coloniality binary for intellectual property
317

See, e.g., Jane Anderson & Kim Christen, “Chuck a Copyright On It”: Dilemmas of Digital
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320
Okediji, supra note 137, at 324 (writing that “Intellectual property law was not merely an
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law, however, is a more complicated one. Decolonization requires
reconstituting universality in a manner, which, instead of substituting
the European for the totality, creates space for the embrace of multiple
perspectives, in a manner, which is both democratic and cosmopolitan.
While we do not offer a model to supplant that of modernity/coloniality,
we note that several nations, such as India,321 Ghana,322 and South
Africa,323 are remaking intellectual properties through the embrace of
digital databases, local models of intellectual property protection, and
rejection of international intellectual property regimes. Moreover,
decolonizing practices can unfold at the individual level as well,
through resistive performative practices, such as discursive
interventions and arts. Our goal in highlighting both the undoing of
narratives of modernity/coloniality in intellectual property and practices
which supplant Western intellectual property law is to point to further
avenues of research for Critical Race IP scholars. Existing scholarship
in these areas suggests that attending to decoloniality as a means of
interrogating the intersections of race and intellectual property is likely
to be a fruitful avenue for further research.
CONCLUSION
This article endeavors to name and provisionally map the field of
Critical Race IP, an area of study which describes that scholarship
concerned with the intersections of race and intellectual property law. In
doing so, it situates Critical Race IP in a larger socio-cultural context, in
which racial capitalism is a constant but evolving feature of the
historical landscape. We contend that the emergence of the Information
Economy, after the era of Fordism, resulted in a repackaging of familiar
racial projects in and through intellectual properties and pushes for
intellectual property maximalism. Critical Race IP represents a
relatively new and rapidly growing direction in CRT scholarship, it is
an exemplar of the ways the latter must constantly evolve to
accommodate changing economic and cultural conditions and racial
formations. In articulating Critical Race IP as an area of study, our goal
is not necessarily to suggest particular methodologies or even fixed
unifying questions that define the interdisciplinary movement. Rather,
we are concerned with naming and describing prevalent themes and
core tenets in a set of scholarly works that interrogate the inequalities
which emerge at the intersections of intellectual property and
intersectional racial identities. We hope that project can be a generative
move for scholars who wish to research, write, and practice in this area.

321
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323
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In setting forth a history of post-Fordism and the rise of Critical
Race IP, we show that, as a product of modernity/coloniality,
intellectual property law is always already invested in whiteness and
racial inequality in ways which necessitate both examination and
undoing. Scholars in a variety of disciplines have started to undertake
such examinations, with their works engaging a set of themes which we
have highlighted here. Continuing to examine questions related to
defining (intellectual) property, understanding intellectual property’s
stories, the public domain, framing and reframing “piracy” and
“counterfeiting,” distributive justice, access to knowledge, managing
traditional knowledge, and contemplating intellectual properties is an
important task, one which we urge scholars to continue to take up in
new and innovative ways. We also highlight the significance of personal
relationships and public feelings in developing this area of study. One
way to facilitate dialogue and scholarship in Critical Race IP is to invest
in community building and intimacy making, cornerstones of the
growth and development of CRT, both of which play a valuable role in
cultivating generative interpersonal connections and structures of
feeling through which new ideas can flourish. Conferences and
workshops as well as collaborative projects which bring together senior
and junior scholars play a significant role in cultivating and retaining
Critical Race IP scholars. Finally, in concluding with a discussion of the
decolonial turn, we offer a framework for moving beyond the radically
unequal systems produced from the vantage point of law and
economics, which has been historically complicit in intellectual
property law’s theoretical and practical centering of whiteness.
Decolonization, a process that began to unfold after World War II, is
not only a physical process but an epistemological one, which requires
addressing intellectual property’s embeddedness within practices and
ideologies of modernity/coloniality as well as the connections between
the latter and racism and neocolonialism. Here, we offer decolonization
as a means of beginning to contemplate the remaking of intellectual
property law, in ways that not only radically embrace Otherness but
make space for non-European ways of thinking, making, and owning
knowledge. As we imagine it, Critical Race IP is a space for creating
models for the politics of reparation—not simply equal rights or
distributive justice—through which oppressed groups can heal the
wounds of racism and colonialism.
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